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Paradox Lost
F.H. Buckley*
The fundamental question of contract theory is why a
promise gives rise to a legal obligation. Without promising, the
scope of contract law shrinks to immediate transfers of property; and without a justification for promissory institutions, a
considerable part of contract law is of dubious normative content. An analysis of some special feature of contract law, such
as consideration requirements, could not aspire to great moral
status if promissory institutions could be abolished without apparent loss.
This Article defends a utilitarian theory of promising,
under which legal and moral obligations to perform promises
are justified by the felicific consequences of a convention of
promise keeping. Utilitarian theories, once accepted as providing the most plausible normative support for the economic
analysis of law, fell into disfavor about ten years ago.1 The rejection of utilitarianism now seems premature because many of
2
the criticisms leveled at it do not withstand close scrutiny.
This Article does not seek to defend utilitarianism in general,
however, but rather to demonstrate the inadequacy of rival,
nonutilitarian theories. It does so through an analysis of contract theory, for if utilitarianism alone offers a persuasive account of so fundamental a legal institution as contract law,
lawyers will find rival theories difficult to accept.
The first rival theory, identified most closely with John
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University. I am indebted
for comments on earlier drafts of this Article to Richard Epstein, Serge
Gaudet, Esther Goldberg, Mane Hajdin, David Stevens, and the participants at
conferences at the University of Sherbrooke and George Mason School of Law.
Special thanks also go to my research assistants, Jason Mogg and Kevin

Woodall.
1. For a discussion of the movement away from utilitarianism, see R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-60 (1981), which is based on Posner,

Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
2. The clearest rebuttal of the anti-utilitarian position is found in D.
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 3-114 (1984). For a shorter statement of many
of these arguments, see Smart, An Outline of a System of UtilitarianEthics,
in UTILITARIANISM; FOR AND AGAINST 1 (J. Smart & B. Williams eds. 1973).
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Rawls, is referred to as a low-fidelity theory because it does not
invest promising with a moral status. Under this theory promissory obligations ultimately rest on morally compelling connecting factors between individuals and morally neutral
institutions. 3 The institution of promising is not ethically desirable in itself. Rather, the connecting factors alone have moral
force.
Under high-fidelity explanations, in contrast, the duty to
support promising arises as a consequence of the institution's
desirability. Examples of high-fidelity theories include both
utilitarianism and neoformalism, 4 'which is utilitarianism's second rival. Neoformalism defends promising on the basis of the
moral value of a right to promise. As a high-fidelity explanation of promising, neoformalism seeks to provide a justification
for the institution of promising and is not simply a theory that,
on principles of rights, promises made in a promissory society
are binding. Although neoformalists are rights theorists, not
all rights theorists are neoformalists, for in promissory matters
a rights theorist might subscribe to a low-fidelity theory.
Neoformalism today attempts to recapture private law institutions from a perspective of rights. Like the earlier formalists, neoformalists analyze legal institutions with little regard to
their end-state consequences. Unlike their predecessors, however, the neoformalists' defense of contract law is more selfconsciously philosophical, with principles of moral choice derived from deontological theories which exclude evidence of the
remote consequences of acts. The neoformalists' readiness to
bring forward the Kantian heavy artillery may be seen as a
compliment to the strength of their adversaries, the nihilists
and consequentialists, for whom no justification, or only one
that looks to end states, is possible.
Neoformalist theories attempt both to explain and to justify legal rules and institutions by reference to the moral values
they serve. The two endeavors are quite different, for the
3. See J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-50 (1971).
4. Neoformalism is a term used in this Article. The leading example of
the neoformalist analysis of contract law is C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PRoMIsE
(1981), which applies a general theory of promissory obligations to the broad
contours of contract law. A chapter on lying in C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG
54-78 (1978) provides an excellent analysis of misrepresentation from the perspective of a rights theory. In addition, the libertarian theory of contracts may
be neoformalist in its insistence on the respect to be accorded a right to promise. See, e.g., Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269,
291-300 (1986).
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descriptive exercise of identifying the values courts find underlying contract law differs from the justification of the institution's ways to man. The descriptive project is a crucial part of
any theory of contracts, for if the institution that is defended
does not resemble the accepted regime of contract law, some
otherwise valid contracts will not generate an obligation of performance. This would be a serious failure, for a normative theory would be unattractive if adherence to it came at the cost of
jettisoning one class of binding agreements.5 However, the discovery of that value which underlies every valid contract does
not of itself generate a moral theory of contracts. Unless it is
assumed that the value is ethically desirable, its explanatory
power is on the same moral plane as my decision to organize
my library by author and not by subject matter. Thus, a justification of promising must be a normative theory which at the
same time can account for the circumstances when promises
are in fact binding.
While promissory theories would be unpersuasive if they
claimed that valid promises did not oblige, they need not seek
to explain every kind of bargaining activity. Promissory theorists are therefore free to focus on contract as promise.6 Even
5. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 270 (criteria for selecting a theory inwhether it handles known problems as well as or better than its rivals).
6. As a matter of strategy, a combatant may pick the terrain, eschewing
war on all fronts. In a defense of contract law, promissory theorists may legitimately narrow their focus to contract as promise, seeking to justify the legal
enforcement of promises in the promisor's moral obligation to perform. This
is not to say that all contracts reduce to forward-looking promises. Even nonpromissory societies may know the bare gift or simultaneous exchange, by
which property (shorn of any warranty rights) may be transferred in the immediate present. Contract law would then largely be limited to the conditions
that determine the validity of consent, without any need for promises of future
performance.
In the same way, an analysis of contract as promise does not deny the
existence of nonpromissory, cooperative norms in many bargains, particularly
those involving relational contracts. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1981). For a discussion of nonpromissory norms in contract, see I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SocIAL CONTRACT.
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) (contract as the
relations among parties in the process of future change); Macneil, Values in
Contract. Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 340 (1983) [hereinafter
Macneil, Values in Contract] (contract as the relations among people in the
course of projecting exchanges into the future); Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contracts,47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974) (relational norms aim at protection of
relationship between parties). The promissory skeptic might then ask
whether promises can be viewed in isolation from broader social eonventions.
But if admittedly not everything in contract is promise, so too not everything
is background convention, social norm, firm, or relationship, with one kind of

clude
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when restricted to contract as promise, however, promissory
obligations cannot be understood except by reference to a preexisting convention or institution that permits obligations to be
incurred in this way. Although the moral status of promissory
obligations distinguishes promising from more trivial institutions, conceding a moral value to the imperative does not explain how an individual may have an obligation to perform a
promise. If commands are issued by a convention, how do they
command me? A justification of promissory institutions requires a principle of fidelity by which the convention's moral
imperatives ought to be regarded as binding on a particular

individual.
This Article argues that a principle of fidelity can be derived only by assuming the moral worth of the convention, but
it does not seek to demonstrate that promissory institutions
ought to exist. 7 Instead, it assumes that promising is morally
desirable and asks what conclusions follow therefrom.8 Part I
examines promising as a convention, following the well-known
discussion of conventional rules by John Searle and John
monism replacing another. The contract theorist may then select promising
for analysis, and ask what values attach to it.
Macneil, from whose holistic perspective it is unrealistic to examine institutions in fractions, criticized C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981) for its
focus on promising. See Macneil, Values in Contract,supra, at 409. If everything is connected in this way, however, the only kind of knowledge is of
everything at all times and in every place, and the work of analysis, which
considers discrete institutions and transactions, would be impossible.
Read uncritically, Macneil's studies might lead one to wonder how promising is possible at all. This kind of mistake, not accurately attributed to
Macneil, seems a species of what Austin termed the ivresse des grandes
profondeurs. See J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 176 (1970) (discussing Austin's
theory of speech acts).
7. Promising ends at the border of the doctrine of illegality. A further
question therefore remains of where, on the continuum between individual
liberty and paternalism, promises ought not to be performed. I offer no solution to that problem, nor do I purport to meet the arguments of extreme paternalists who, by expanding the realm of illegality, would ban promising
altogether.
Lawyers have recently given much attention to paternalism. See, eg.,
Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 970 (1985); Jackson,
The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1985);
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983);
Sunstein, Legal Interference with PrivatePreferences,53 U. CM. L. REV. 1129
(1986). For a useful introduction to recent philosophical studies of the subject,
see PATERNALISM (R. Sartorius ed. 1983).
8. This device owes much to H.L.A. Hart (although its origin is Kantian).
See Hart, Are There Any NaturalRights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955) (promissory
institutions presuppose a range of unfettered action).
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Rawls. 9 Because promising is conventional, the obligation to
perform a promise must rest on a principle of fidelity to promising by which the convention's rules bind individuals. Two
kinds of duties of allegiance are distinguished. Under lowfidelity obligations, the principle of allegiance requires a morally compelling connecting factor between the individual and a
convention. High-fidelity duties, on the other hand, base fidelity requirements on the duty to support just institutions, dispensing with special connecting factors.
Part II considers whether principles of low fidelity to
promising may satisfactorily be generated through connecting
factors. Various explanations of promissory institutions, based
on different connecting factors, are examined from this perspective. Although voluntary consent by the promisor, acceptance of benefits, and promisee reliance might all be proffered
as possible links between individuals and institutions, none of
these provides an adequate account of promising. A successful
defense of fidelity requirements must therefore assume the
moral value of promissory institutions.
Part III examines what the values of the institution might
be in high-fidelity theories. The first high-fidelity theory discussed is neoformalism, which prizes the institution for permitting individuals to exercise a right to promise. Like low-fidelity
theories, neoformalism is unpersuasive. While promising might
at first seem desirable from a libertarian perspective, the institution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of a free
society. As a consequence promissory institutions cannot be
justified on abstract libertarian norms but must instead be defended for the special values of a regime of promising. Neoformalism, however, is unable to identify the ethically desirable
attributes of promising and therefore must be rejected. Given
9.

J. SEARLE, supra note 6, at 33-53. Rawls first set forth his analysis of

conventional rules in Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955),
which argued that utilitarian theories of promising were more plausible on a
conventional account of the institution. By contrast, this Article suggests that
only utilitarianism offers a persuasive theory of promissory institutions.
Rawls later abandoned his utilitarian explanation of promising in J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-50 (1971).

Hume's category of "naturally unintelligible" rules would seem to have
anticipated Searle's constitutive rules. D. HUmE, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, § 5, at 516-25 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1967); see J. MACKIE,
HuME's MORAL THEORY 96-99 (1980). Kelsen suggested a similar distinction,
noting that promissory obligations depend on a higher norm which permits the
parties to create obligations by promising. Kelsen, La thioriejuridique de la

convention, 1940 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 33, 47.
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the failure of neoformalism, contract theorists must choose between consequentialism, which accords a moral status to the
consequences of adopting a promissory regime, and nihilism,
which does not. This Article concludes that only utilitarianism
provides a satisfactory defense of the institution of promising.
I. OBLIGATIONS OF FIDELITY
It sometimes helps to begin by asking what the questions
are. Thus, it is a false start to ask why promises should be performed, for the proposition that promises are prima facie morally binding is analytic. As a matter of definition, then, a
promise ought to be kept unless it is trumped by an overriding
ethical concern, as under the doctrine of illegality in contract
law. Instead of asking why promises should be performed, the
primary question for promissory theory is why a convention
that issues moral obligations is rightly regarded as binding
upon an individual. Answering this question requires both an
explanation of how promising is conventional and a general
theory of fidelity to conventions.
A. PROMISING AS CONVENTION
The device of describing promising as a convention, even if
widely accepted in analytic philosophy, no doubt remains
counterintuitive. In fact, if convention is used to mean a societal institution that could easily be dismantled,' 0 promising is
not conventional. 1 ' In another sense of the term, however,
promising is conventional. Here a convention is a set of rules
that creates the very possibility 'of the activity in question, and
an institution is conventional if it cannot exist without these
rules. Games provide the clearest examples of such rules: one
can swing at a ball without making contact, but only in a game
does this count as a strike. Without the rules of the game, the
activity of striking out, hitting a home run, or stealing second
would not be possible. For this reason, Searle described these
rules as constitutive rules (C-rules). 12 To say that a rule is conventional, then, does not mean that it relates to a particular society, but rather that the rule cannot be imagined without the
convention. Searle distinguished C-rules from regulative rules
(R-rules), which prescribe activity without regard to the con10. See Midgley, The Game Game, 49 PHIL. 231, 252 (1974).
11. The frequent use by philosophers of game as a synonym of convention
may bring this meaning to mind.
12. J. SEARLE, supra note 6, at 33-42.
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ventions of a society.13 For example, normative R-rules indicate whether a particular activity is right or wrong but do not
define the activity. The distinction between the two kinds of
rules is not always sharp, and promissory C-rules may overlap
with R-rules. Thus, physical duress may void a contract but
might also be wrong even without the convention.
Like R-rules, C-rules also regulate (otherwise they would
not be rules). In addition to prescribing conduct, however, Crules create the very possibility of the activity. 14 Moreover, Crules may specify not only the consequences of breach but also
what kind of conduct is within or without the convention. For
example, promissory conventions may stipulate when an utterance successfully constitutes a promise and when it misfires
and does not impose an obligation.
Those rules whose compliance require the use of a language constitute a special kind of C-rules, for language is itself
a convention. For example, prohibitions of lying are C-rules because they depend on a language under which assertions are ordinarily taken as truthful.1 5 Without the convention, the act of
asserting would not be possible. Similarly, promising requires a
language (or some other convention) that specifies what counts
as a promise.
Some resistance to this analysis may come from those who
suspect that it represents a downgrading of promissory obligations. Conventional explanations are indeed objectionable if
they mistake an R-rule for a C-rule, for such a mistake could
13. Id.
14. The distinction between the two kinds of rules may have little to do
with their prevalence in various societies. For example, an R-rule may not be
incorporated into the operating norms of every society. Even when an R-rule
is not incorporated, however, it is still meaningful to speak of the rule being
breached, with the failure of the society's norms to incorporate it going at best
to an excuse for decidedly wrongful behavior. The excuse could even be rejected and the R-rule thought categorical, giving rise to an absolute prohibition
at all times in every society. Similarly, a C-rule may be universal if all societies have adopted the convention. Unlike R-rules, however, a plea that the
convention does not figure in one's society is not an excuse but rather a denial
that the activity took place.
15. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 57 (1978) (every assertion intended
to "be understood as an intended move within the assertion game");
Khatchadourian, Institutions,Practicesand Moral Rules, 86 MIND 479, 482-84
(1977). A language without such a convention might be imagined, although
only with some difficulty. But see Winch, Nature and Convention, 60 PRoC.
ARIsrorELiAN Soc'Y 231, 242 (1959-1960) ("[T]he notion of a society in which
there is a language but in which truth-telling is not regarded as the norm is a
self-contradictory one.").
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change the nature of the prohibition. If the obligation is contingent upon a society's adoption of a particular convention, then
the most heinous act could be rendered benign simply by swapping conventions. We would therefore insist that rules against
murder, for example, do not rest on conventions about bodily
integrity.
To say that promissory obligations are conventional, however, does not mean that they must be of a lower normative
force. A convention's C-rules may endow its outputs with a
moral status, and this in fact is how promising works. Promising prima facie provides a sufficient moral reason to perform.
Asking why this is so, as Rawls noted, is like wondering why
batters do not get four strikes.16 Thus, it is a manifest contradiction for a person to say, "I promise to do X but am under no
obligation to do so." Such a person either is not promising, or
does not understand what promising means. Promissory conventions are therefore to be distinguished from nonmoral
games whose imperatives are of a "have-to" kind.17 (If you
want to get on base, this is what you have to do.) Unlike the
rules of baseball, which tell us only how to play the game,
promissory obligations are both have-to and ought-to in nature.
Nonperformance of a promise is not merely unconventional but
also morally wrong.
B.

RULES OF FIDELITY

The moral status of promissory obligations rests on a rule
of fidelity to the convention. Unless it can be connected to people, contract law must be, as an institution without members, a
matter of moral indifference. To make this more concrete, consider the parallel to political allegiance. Suppose that Norway
may be characterized as a just society. From this, it does not
follow that a Canadian has a duty of allegiance to Norway.'8
Similarly, a society may have a convention that wearing a hat
gives rise to a peculiar moral consequence. If, hatted, I visit the
society, a resident might claim that the convention is invoked.
But I may legitimately object that the convention does not bind
foreigners. Everyone would agree that a principle of allegiance
16; Rawls, supra note 9, at 64.
17. For the distinction between have-to and ought-to rules, see Cameron,
'Ought' and InstitutionalObligation,46 PHIL. 309 (1971).
18. For this reason Simmons argues that "we need a principle of political
obligation which binds the citizen to one particular state above all others."
A.J. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 31-32 (1979)

(emphasis in original).
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is needed to bind the foreigner. If so, however, a principle of
allegiance is also required to bind a resident of the society.
(When does one stop being a foreigner?) In the same way, it is
impossible for a promisor to derive a moral obligation to perform merely by doing that which constitutes promising according to the convention. Instead, one must ask what it is about a
convention that makes it my convention to follow. If no principle of fidelity explains why the promisor is rightly regarded
as bound by the convention, she is not obliged to perform.
Rules of fidelity differ from the convention's membership
C-rules because no convention in itself requires allegiance without an outside principle of fidelity. In some cases a reference to
membership C-rules may adequately explain why a rule should
be followed. If the door to a private club bears the sign, "Members only," and I (as a nonmember) enter anyway, the doorkeeper has an easy answer if I ask, "Why can't I go in?" So too,
the laws of Norway define citizenship in that country, and
promissory C-rules tell us who is a promisor. This will not,
however, generate a principle of fidelity if the C-rules (including membership rules) may be legitimately challenged. For example, one might claim that the club's membership policies
wrongly exclude academic lawyers and assert a right to enter.
In the same way, Canadians may resist the application of Norwegian laws whatever the citizenship laws of that country.
These cases require a principle of fidelity separate from institutional membership rules.1 9
19. See Khatchadourian, supra note 15, at 486-96. Searle's derivation of an
ought from an is seems vulnerable. In an abbreviated form, Searle's argument
is that, from the statement, (1) "Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to
pay you, Smith, five dollars,"' it follows as a tautology both that (2) Jones
promised to pay Smith five dollars, and (3) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. See J. SEARLE, supra note 6, at 177. Hence an evaluative conclusion (3) is
derived from a nonevaluative promise (1). See id at 175-98. Searle emphasized that his thesis concerned the philosophy of language and not ethics, or
"oughts" and not "moral oughts." Id at 176-77. In either case, however, it
must be assumed that Jones is bound by the convention for the derivation to
work. While Searle appeared to think that such membership questions could
be resolved solely through the C-rules, this will not suffice to generate fidelity
rules. Even if a convention points to me, I can still ask, "And am I bound?"
As Hare noted, what links me to a convention must be something outside the
convention. Hare, The Promising Game, 18 REv. INT'L DE PmIL. 398, 408-12
(1964).
Hare's reference to a need for "subscribing members" to a convention will
not, however, commend itself to one who rejects contractarian explanations of
an obligation of allegiance. Id. at 411. For reasons discussed in Part II, Searle
is correct in arguing that the act of promising need not amount to an affirmation of the value of the institution. See J. SEARLE, supra note 6, at 194-95; see
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Hybrid Rules

Fidelity rules are a species of a more general kind of rule
that regulates relationships between conventions and people.
These are hybrid rules (H-rules), which are exclusionary when
they prescribe who may not participate in a convention and inclusionary when they specify who must do so. H-rules are
neither constitutive nor regulative but resemble both. They are
regulative insofar as they do not create a convention and conventional insofar as they cannot be understood without one.
These exclusionary and inclusionary rules are not R-rules because they cannot be understood by one not familiar with the
convention (for example, no admittance to what?). But H-rules
are not C-rules either, for a breach of the rule leaves the game
intact (for example, girls playing minor league hockey). When
played in violation of an exclusionary H-rule, a game is still a
game. Nonobservance of an H-rule, therefore, is different from
nonobservance of a C-rule. This may seem unduly dogmatic,
because it is undoubtedly possible to play baseball without complying with all of its C-rules, for example, by ignoring the infield fly rule (or playing with designated hitters). The relevant
question, however, is not "What is baseball?," but rather "What
are its rules?" Some rules are H-rules about baseball rather
20
than C-rules of baseball.
2.

High and Low Fidelity

Fidelity duties vary in their content, and the requirements
of an inclusionary H-rule may depend on the nature of the institution. It might involve a subscription for-membership or financial support for well-organized institutions. Other
institutions might demand adherence in less exacting ways,
such as through requirements of noninterference.
In the case of promising, it is helpful to distinguish two different kinds of fidelity to an institution. Duties of high fidelity
arise when the institution is so morally desirable that societies
without the institution are less just. In such cases every individual, no matter how remote from the institution, owes it
allegiance. If the institution already exists, it should be granted
such support as it requires, and conscientious objection should
be prohibited. If the institution does not exist, it should be fosalso Zemach, Ought Is, and a Game Called "Promise," 21 PHIL. Q. 61 (1971)
(discussing Searle's views on the act of promising).
20.

I am indebted to Mane Hajdin for pointing out this distinction to me.
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tered.2 1 A justification of a duty of high fidelity requires a
universalizable defense of an institution so good that nonsupport is everywhere prohibited. Duties of high fidelity then
arise naturally in that they are imposed with or without voluntary acceptance of the institution.22
By contrast, the principle of low fidelity only binds individuals to an institution by virtue of the particular connecting factor between the two. One example of this is political allegiance
to a particular state, in which duties of fidelity may depend on
residence or citizenship. Without the requisite nexus, no duty
to support the institution arises. If the connecting factor legitimately could be erased, conscientious objectors might then opt
out of the institution. Although other variants exist, the lead23
ing low-fidelity theory of promising is that of Rawls.
What may serve as a connecting factor in a regime of low
fidelity depends on the institution in question. In the case of
promising, one frequently mentioned candidate is a voluntary
act by the promisor from which attornment to the institution's
jurisdiction may be implied. Because the act is consensual, the
requirement is referred to as an obligation, the term duty being
reserved for imperatives that arise without our consent.2
Describing a low-fidelity inclusionary requirement as an obligation may, if one is not careful, lead to confusion, for promising,
as a voluntary act, also generates obligations. It is therefore
necessary to distinguish between the obligation of low fidelity
and the promissory obligation created by the promise. The first
kind of obligation might be thought to be owed to institutions
and the second to people, if requirements to an institution
made sense. It is, however, more accurate to think of fidelity
obligations as different in kind from promissory obligations, being rather an element in the justification of institutional rules.
Through fidelity requirements, a promisor is estopped from
asserting an otherwise available defense to the imposition of a
promissory obligation.
Whether a duty is one of high or low fidelity may depend
21. For example, Rawls's duty of justice, premised on a just society, requires that we both support and comply with just institutions which exist and
apply to us and also further just arrangements not yet established, at least
when this can be done at little individual cost. J. RAwLS, supra note 3, at 115,
334.
22. See id. at 115.
23. See id. at 115-16, 342-45 (discussing principle of fairness or fidelity to
promising).

24. Id. at 114-15, 343-44.
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on the normative value of the underlying institution. A duty of
high fidelity might then arise from a more ethically desirable
institution, with an ethically neutral one generating only an obligation of low fidelity. For example, if truth-telling conventions were so valuable as to support high-fidelity duties, the
inclusionary rule that prohibits cheating at cards would likely
be one of low fidelity. In other cases the distinction may turn
on the scope of the institution itself. Thus, although allegiance
to the just state of Norway is a low-fidelity duty based on a particular connecting factor (such as domicile), a Rawlsian duty to
support just societies in the abstract may be one of high
fidelity. 25
The justice of the institution is not wholly irrelevant to a
low-fidelity theory, for at some point its actual injustice would
break any bonds of allegiance. In addition, even just institutions may give rise to a principle of low and not high fidelity.
Because political allegiance to the just state of Norway requires
a connecting factor, the duty is one of low fidelity. Furthermore, the existence of the right kind of connecting factor is a
necessary but not a sufficient reason for low-fidelity requirements. For example, one may be bound to two different institutions by separate connecting factors, and allegiance to both
may not be feasible. In such cases the dispute may perhaps be
resolved by reference to institutional values. 26 Thus, while institutional value implies a high-fidelity theory, low fidelity does
not necessarily imply a morally neutral institution. Nevertheless, because the justice of the institution need not be of great
concern under low-fidelity theories, such theories will be
deemed to refer to morally neutral institutions.
Clearly, theories of high and low fidelity cannot explain
every question of fidelity. For example, the distinction between
the two kinds of duties may have little to do with the kind of
support appropriate to a particular institution. If low-fidelity
obligations have a lesser stature than high-fidelity duties, this is
not because low-fidelity obligations are necessarily less onerous,
but only because they depend on a special connecting factor.
Low-fidelity obligations may vary in intensity, from require25. Id. at 115.
26. For example, suppose that as an academic lawyer I feel that I ought to
support an association of law teachers from whose activities I derive benefits
(the receipt of benefits constituting the connecting factor). If two such associations exist, I may decide that my obligation of allegiance is owed to the one
that best accords with principles of justice, whether or not I derive more benefits from it.
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ments of mere noninterference to duties such as enlisting in an
army during wartime. In addition, when a right of conscientious objection is asserted, those realms of low fidelity, which
rightfully forbid defection once the connecting factor has been
established, resemble high-fidelity regimes. When the connecting factor is an indelible mark, individuals already bound to a
low-fidelity duty differ little from their high-fidelity brethren.
Among defenses of promising, low-fidelity theories are today ascendant.27 It was not always so. Earlier writers assumed
that a justification of the institution of promising had to be
based on an affirmation of the libertarian values or the goals of
promissory regimes. 2s A preference for low-fidelity imperatives
may then be rooted in a rejection of the values that seem implicit in ethical defenses of the institution. In addition, reasons
of economy suggest that institutional values need not be considered if promising may be adequately explained from a lowfidelity perspective. Such theories would then rest not on the
ethical value of institutions, but on the connecting factors
which bind them to us.
II. LOW-FIDELITY REQUIREMENTS
Low-fidelity explanations of promising may be either
promisor- or promisee-based, depending on the connecting factors that give rise to requirements of allegiance.

Promisor-

based theories focus on the voluntariness of the promisor's conduct in invoking a regime with its own ethical imperatives. An
obligation of low fidelity to the institution of promising may
thus arise either through consent to the imposition of an obligation or through voluntary acceptance of benefits from promis27. One example of this is Rawls's uncharacteristically fatalistic attitude
toward institutions (other than the most general features of a just society):
one takes them as one finds them. See J. RAWIS, supra note 3, at 348-49. Provided that they are not actually unjust, they may be accepted without the need
to inquire whether any better institution exists. In addition, critics of promissory institutions are today more prominent than their defenders, whether they
subscribe to low- or high-fidelity theories. For an overview of promissory nihilism, see C. FRIED, supra note 6, at 1-6.
28. "[D]ans sa mystique, l'autonomie de la volont6 consacrerait la libert6,
pour les parties, de contracter dcleur guise, et sur tout ce qui les int&esse,
puisque le Code civil les assimile au lgislateur." R. SAVATIER, LA THORIE
DES OBLIGATIONS § 91, at 142 (1967) (emphasis in original); see also C.
BEAUDANT, LE DROrr INDIVIDUEL ET L'9TAT 146 (2d ed. 1891); G. RIPERT, LA
RPGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES § 22, at 38 (4th ed. 1949); Kelsen,
supra note 9, at 48 ("on doit finalement constater que le principe politique de
l'autonomie en mati&re de contrats repose sur une conception individualiste ou
lib~rale de la vie").
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ing. In promisee-based theories, on the other hand, the
inclusionary duties rest on reliance by the promisee. In each
case the question is why one should support an institution that
has no moral significance in itself.
To be successful, a low-fidelity theory must show why allegiance is owed. This alone is not sufficient, however, for the institution that the theory describes also must resemble the
accepted regime of promising. A connecting factor that cannot
explain why some valid promises are binding cannot provide an
adequate justification of promising. The theory, through its
connecting factors, must then be able to account for both the Hrules of fidelity and the C-rules of promissory obligations.
Low-fidelity theories are generally unsatisfactory on both
grounds. Neither consent nor benefits theories offer a compelling account of fidelity requirements, and only promisee reliance provides a plausible connecting factor between individuals
and the institution. Even reliance theories, however, fail to describe promissory C-rules in an acceptable manner because
they must gerrymander promises that are not relied on outside
of the institution. None of these low-fidelity theories covers all
of the contours of promising, for nothing is like promising save
promising.
A.

PROMISOR-BASED THEORIES:

CONSENT

Two kinds of theories may base fidelity to promissory regimes on consensual values. An institution that permits an obligation to result from a consensual act may be thought just,
insofar as freedom to choose through promising is considered
morally desirable. This explanation, called a will theory because of its focus on voluntariness, endows the C-rules of promising with an ethical content. Because the will theory assumes
the moral value of the institution, it must be a high-fidelity theory. As a consequence, will theories cannot be justified from a
low-fidelity perspective.
A low-fidelity consent theory must then base a principle of
allegiance on the promisor's consent to the imposition of the
obligation. Consent theories are, however, subject to two fatal
objections. First, it is not possible to demonstrate that promisors actually do consent in a meaningful way to the institution's
C-rules. Moreover, even if they did, consent theories would be
circular since they cannot explain how consent to promissory
institutions could impart an obligation without a prior convention of promising.
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Reality of the Consent

No promisor formally subscribes to the institution of promising, as a partner may to a firm, and so an act of tacit consent
must suffice. The duty to support a promissory regime thus resembles the model of political allegiance provided by social contract theorists. The parallel between fidelity to promising and
allegiance to a state is closest when the consent to both is
thought to arise solely from residence in regimes in which
promissory institutions may be found. Thus, John Locke believed that a foreign visitor to England tacitly consented to
29
obey its laws merely by travelling through the country.
Although tacit, the consent must be real if it is to support a
promise of allegiance. It is difficult, however, to see how such a
theory can withstand David Hume's attack on contractarian explanations of allegiance. As Hume noted, the contractarian justification of political allegiance is quite implausible if the
consent is implied from forms of participation over which the
individual has little control.30 Consent must presuppose
rejectability. As for promissory allegiance, mere residence in a
promising society is even less likely to provide evidence of tacit
consent to the institution, it being harder still to leave promissory societies than political states.
On the other hand, a stronger case for promissory allegiance might be thought to arise if the requisite consent could
be found in promising itself. Here the act of promising is seen
as a voluntary adherence to an institution whose C-rules determine when obligations arise and are extinguished. By promising, the promisor assumes an obligation to the promisee; in
promising, the promisor incurs an obligation of fidelity to the
institution.31 So regarded, the obligation to support promising
29. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True, OriginalExtent and End of
Civil Government, in SocIAL CONTRACr 1, 70-71 (E. Barker ed. 1970).

30. Hume argued
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice
to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners,
and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We
may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board
while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish, the moment he
leaves her.
Hume, Of the OriginalContract,in SocIAL CoNTRACr 145, 156 (E. Barker ed.
1970). For other critiques of contractarian explanations of political allegiance,
see J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 336-37; Murphy, Consen4 Coercion, and Hard

Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79 (1981); Simmons, Consen4 Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 791 (1984).
31.

See Barnett, supra note 4, at 305 (under consent theory promisor's in-
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regimes is positional, attaching to one who voluntarily occupies
the position of promisor pursuant to a convention whose membership rules impose obligations to perform on those who take
on that position. The principle of fidelity to promising is then
similar to the obligation of an elected representative to perform
the functions of a political office for which he has campaigned.
In both cases voluntary behavior that fulfills the conditions for
the application of C-rules explains why it is right that such
rules are binding.
This amended contractarian theory of promising still leans
heavily on tacit consent. While little sense can be made of consent to a promising regime unless a realistic possibility exists of
rejecting promising, it is not easy to see how this might conscientiously be done. Could all promissory language systematically be pruned from one's vocabulary? Eliminating gerunds
would likely be harder, while the subjunctive might perhaps be
done away with a little more easily. Even that would not suffice for nonverbal conduct signifying consent. Thus, the possibility of opting out of promising entirely seems a little
farfetched.3 2 Yet contractarian theories of promising must
assume that it is possible because the consent to promising
would otherwise be entirely fictitious.
If consent to promising is the moral glue that holds together all contracts, it is curious that there has been so little
concern to obtain such consent. One might propose, in the invocation of institution provides justification for legal enforcement of contracts). This would also appear to have been Searle's view of how one is bound
to adhere to a promissory regime. See J. SEARLE, supra note 6, at 194-95
(promising invokes undertaking to use the word promise in accordance with
its literal meaning). A contractarian explanation of allegiance would be plausible if, as Searle thought, a promisor must intend that his utterance will place
him under an obligation. See id. at 60. If this were the case, a false promise by
one who lacks the requisite state of mind might not be binding. The objective
theory of contract, however, which dispenses with such spiritual acts, better
accords with our understanding of what constitutes a promise. Under the objective theory, a court "exercises its jurisdiction for the enforcement of the
truth, and makes a man's acts square with his words, by compelling him to
perform what he has undertaken." Laver v. Fielder, 32 Beav. 1, 13, 55 Eng.
Rep. 1, 5 (M.R. 1862); see J. AusTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 10 (2d
ed. 1975) ("Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that
our word is our bond.") (emphasis in original).
32. See Hanfling, Promises, Games and Institutions, 75 PRoc. ARISTOTELiAN Soc'Y 13, 22 (1974-1975) (nonrejectable institutions like promising must
be distinguished from rejectable games). Principles of fidelity to the institution still stand in need of justification, however, because a nonconscientious
rejection is always possible, with rebels opting out of performance if not out of
promising.
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terest of resolving moral ambiguities, promissory registration
legislation under which only promises by current registrants
are binding. The-registration system would be expensive, but
such prudential or utilitarian concerns would have little importance next to the higher moral purpose served by the scheme.
The plan would be equitable, just, and entirely silly. That no
sensible person would accept it may put the concern to find a
consent to promising in its proper place. This in turn suggests
• not that such consent may be presumed, but rather that some
33
other justification for promising must be sought.
One further attempt at a hypothetical consent must also be
rejected. If real consent were possible and a meaningful possibility of rejecting the convention existed, contractarian theories
would be unstable insofar as free riders might opt out for strategic reasons. This is to be deprecated if the convention is
thought beneficial, and in a hypothetical agreement all members would then consent to the imposition of duties of allegiance. In this way lapsed contractarians may reduce consent
to a subservient role. The state is not just because it is chosen;
rather, it is chosen because it is just. But if it is assumed that
the state is just, consent is superfluous and fidelity may instead
be based on a duty to support just institutions. Actual consent
is unnecessary if it suffices that one ought to consent. The result, expressly adopted by Rawls in the case of political allegiance, is a duty of high fidelity.3 So too, it is difficult to see
how a moral obligation to support a convention of promising
can be derived from a hypothetical consent to a beneficial insti35
tution unless the benefits are endowed with a moral status.
2.

Circularity
Even if a meaningful possibility of consent existed, a con-

33. Even if a consent to promising were somewhere to be found, this
might not suffice to justify the institution. Such a consent would demonstrate
a preference for promissory over nonpromissory regimes but nothing more
than that. In particular it would not in any way show that the institution's Crules are preferred to any other set of promissory rules that might be
imagined and is not now available.
34. J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 334-37.

35.

This forms the basis of Dworkin's argument that hypothetical consent

to wealth maximization norms is not equivalent to real consent. Dworkin,
Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 574-79 (1980). In the same way,

Gauthier's contractarian justification of dispositions of constrained maximization cannot be qualified as a theory of ethics unless the consequences of such
dispositions are regarded as good. See D. GAUTnEr, MoRALs BY AGREEMENT
167-70 (1986).
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tractarian explanation of high fidelity to promising would still
be objectionable as circular. The theory requires something
like a promise to obey promises, and it founders in its inability
to explain why the first promise is binding. 36 Suppose that two
members of a nonpromising society, aware of this difficulty,
seek to craft their own promises. So long as the society has
some concept of moral duty, they might stipulate that a person
who breaches a promise is to be considered as acting wrongly.
They might then agree upon their own private contract regime,
with C-rules as detailed as any of those found in a promising
regime. In these circumstances Joseph Raz argues that they
have consented to the rules of promising and that the promisor
is required to perform.3 7 But is she? Assume that the parties
specify that a certain verbal formulary signifies that an obligation has been undertaken. This might be a statement such as
"Let me be bound to perform." Even here, however, it is meaningful to ask whether the private convention morally binds its
participants. Without a convention to uphold private conventions, they are not bound. But what is the prior convention, if
not the institution of promising? The convention was constituted by its two participants through a promise to adhere to its
norms. If that promise were not binding, the convention would
not be, either. A promissory regime therefore cannot be
crafted from a private convention.
If contractarian explanations of high-fidelity duties are
necessarily circular, can a principle of consent sufficient to support an obligation of low fidelity be extracted from adherence
to a convention of promising that already exists? It is unnecessary to wonder how the institution may arise if it is already
present in society. Nevertheless, a justification of an institution
36. The circularity of contractarian explanations of how promising may
arise was noted by Hume. See Hume, supra note 30, at 160-61. To avoid this
difficulty, Locke, while seeking a connecting factor of consent to explain political allegiance, turned to natural law theories to justify allegiance to such institutions as promising and property. See P. RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY 72-73 (1982); J. TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY 48-50 (1980).
In the same way, Rawls's theory of justice cannot plausibly rest on a contractarian foundation. At times Rawls does speak of the deliberation in the
original position in terms of a choice among alternatives. J. RAWLS, supra
note 3, at 11-13, 41-42, 45. In the end, however, the procedure would seem not
consensual but rational, with a single version of the theory deduced from abstract principles. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LnIITs OF JUSTICE 132
(1982) (stating that "what begins as an ethic of choice and consent ends, however unwittingly, as an ethic of insight and self-understanding").

37. See Raz, Promises and Obligations,in LAW, MORALITY, AND SoCIEY,
210, 214-15 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977).
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that relies on a feature of the institution for support is still circular, unless that feature can be independently established as a
criterion of value. Suppose that a promissory regime is not
deemed just in itself, as low-fidelity theorists would have it.
Why then does a promisor's consent to the institution represent
a choice that her society must respect? The assumption must
be that in choosing promising the promisor provides a justification for imposing a promissory regime. This assumption presupposes that the choice itself imports a binding commitment.
Yet this is true only if one is bound to perform that which one
has consented to do. This defense of contractarianism must
then be circular and must reduce to a will theory which justifies contract law on the basis of the intrinsic value of the convention. Because it relies on the value of the convention, this
explanation of promissory allegiance must rest on high-fidelity
theories which dispense with connecting factors.

B. PROMISOR-BASED THEORIES: BENEFITS
1.

Principle of Fairness

The second low-fidelity explanation of promising grounds a
duty of allegiance on the promisor's receipt of a benefit. H.L.A.
Hart regarded this social quasi contract as the only intelligible
foundation of political obligation. "[When a number of persons
conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict
their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions
have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission."3 8 In these circumstances both
groups are bound in a mutuality of restrictions, with the former
accorded a moral right to support from the latter.
One difficulty with Hart's theory is that the obligation of'
fidelity arises whatever the moral quality of the institution or
its benefits. A burglar may thus be subject to an obligation to
a thieves' society that bribes police officers. To rescue his
explanation of inclusionary rules from a duty to support immoral institutions, Hart relies on a category of morally unperformable obligations: although the obligation of fidelity
arises, it may be one that ought not to be performed. 39 Similarly, promissory C-rules might provide that immoral promises
38. Hart, supra note 8, at 185. For a similar argument, see W. Ross, THE
RIGHT AND THE GoOD 27 (1930). Plato's Cito likely advanced the earliest such
theory. See PLATO, Cito, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 27, 37
(E. Hamilton & H. Cairns 2d ed. 1961).
39. Hart, supra note 8, at 185-86.
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generate unperformable obligations. 40 Hart's benefits theory,
however, does not describe how one ordinarily thinks of political allegiance. Even with a receipt of benefits, no obligation
arises to support a wholly evil society. At some point, for example, a state may be so unjust that any obligation of fidelity is
extinguished, with the only possible requirement being a duty
41
of rebellion.
Rawls's benefits theory, called the principle of fairness,
provides a less counterintuitive explanation of duties of fidelity. 2 Unlike Hart's theory, the principle of fairness presupposes that the institution satisfies Rawlsian principles of justice.
But notwithstanding the requirement that the underlying institution be just, the principle of fairness is a low-fidelity theory
of promise keeping. This is because ethically neutral institutions may satisfy the principle of justice, provided that basic liberties are not infringed and that any resulting changes in social
and economic inequalities respect Rawls's difference principle. 43 The more trivial the institution, then, the more easily are
principles of justice satisfied: how, after all, can tiddlywinks be
troublesome under the difference principle? To say that promising is just is therefore not to say that it is necessarily morally
preferable to regimes without promising, as in a high-fidelity
theory of justice. In the same way, Rawls is careful to note that
his theory of justice is compatible with both private and socialized property regimes." Even if one could argue that promising served efficiency goals, this would not provide an ethical
40. That is to say, an obligation that ought not to be performed. That
ought and obligation statements should be distinguished in this way may be
seen in how we think about contradictory promises. If I promise Smith to do

X and Jones to do not-X, the two obligations both stand. I do not, for example,
absolve myself from one of the obligations through a cancelling out of the
promises. On the other hand, I cannot say that I ought to perform both
promises, if ought implies can. On ought and obligation statements, see G.
WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 94-96 (1971); Beran, Ought Obligation
and Duty, 50 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 207, 207-09 (1972); Brandt, The Concepts
of Obligations and Duty, 73 MIND 374, 376-80 (1964).
41. See M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS-EssAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND
CITIZENSHIP 3-23 (1970); Pitkin, Obligations and Consent-II, 60 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 39, 41-42 (1966).
42. J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 342-50. Earlier versions of Rawls's theory,
then called the principle offairplay, may be found in Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 180-84 (1958); Rawls, The Justifcationof Civil Disobedience, in CrviL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACnCE 241 (H. Bedau ed.
1969); Rawls, Legal Obligationand the Duty of FairPlay, in LAw AND PHLosOPHY 3 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
43. J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 75-83.
44. Id. at 274.
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defense of the institution, for Rawlsian principles of justice are
always prior to those of efficiency. 45
Rawls does not specify the sort of benefits he has in mind,
but clearly not every kind will suffice. They must not be too
general, for if they had no reference to promising they could as
easily support a principle of nonfidelity. Neither may they be
too specific. In a bilateral contract, the benefit that comes first
to mind is the promisee's reciprocal promise to perform or his
immediate performance. Basing allegiance on such benefits,
however, is more properly a reliance theory which justifies inclusionary H-rules on the basis of anticipated harm to promisees.46 The benefits must then arise from promising itself. This,
seemingly, is what Rawls has in mind, for the principle of fairness is stated as a rule of adherence to an institution and not
merely an obligation to an individual promisee.
Thus, Rawls's argument is that an individual who has accepted benefits from an ethically neutral (although not unjust)
institution is bound to support it. Benefits that derive from an
institution that is ethically neutral share the institution's neutrality. If benefits were morally desirable in themselves, they
would provide a sufficient reason to adhere to promising regimes. In that case the principle of fairness would simply rest
on the natural duty to support a just regime of promising. Because the duty would be one of high fidelity, it would then be
unnecessary to look for connecting factors. For this reason
Rawls does not seek to base obligations of political allegiance
on a receipt of benefits any more than on social contract theories. His natural duty of allegiance to just societies arises involuntarily, for the institution itself is deemed just.47
Because the benefits of promising are ethically neutral, the
principle of fairness cannot be defended for its effect on the
production of public goods. A benefits theory does indeed
promise greater stability for the institution than consent
theories because beneficiaries are not permitted to free ride. If
beneficiaries do not support an institution, their free riding
may encourage other defections from it until it may at last disappear. When present participants in the institution are injured thereby, this may be objectionable under reliance
theories of promising. Aside from this, however, the collapse of
the institution is of no moral concern if it is ethically neutral.
45. Id. at 79-80.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 67-75.
47. J. RAWLs, supra note 3, at 335-36.
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Free-rider arguments have force only if it is assumed, from a
high-fidelity perspective, that promising should be preserved.
The survival of promissory institutions is therefore no part of
the purpose of the principle of fairness, nor is it justified if that
is its result.
2.

Promissory C-rules

If the receipt of benefits grounds the obligation, as Rawls
argues, promises are not binding when no benefits have been
received. As such, Rawls's explanation of promising is inconsistent with the institution's C-rules. So long as the theory is not
tautological, it should be possible to posit persons who have not
derived benefits from promising, such as recent arrivals from a
nonpromissory regime. Even though they have received no
benefits from promising, we would fault them if they promised
and failed to perform. If they objected, we would simply tell
them that their moral or cultural education was incomplete.
3.

Valuation Problems

A further difficulty of benefits theories is their reliance on
strong assumptions as to how the benefits may be identified.
For example, from a high-fidelity perspective, the advantages of
promising seem entirely obvious, for promising leads to a
greater likelihood of reciprocal reliance by contractors. But
these prospective gains will not suffice to ground the principle
of fairness, under which the benefits must have been received
in the past. The difficulty of identifying the benefit (not morally good in itself) that is received by living in a promising society is analogous to the problem that arises in restitution when
unsolicited services are provided. While the donor of the services may have incurred a detriment, absent something that
looks like solicitation or consent it is not clear that such services are of any value to the recipient. As a consequence
officious gifts ordinarily do not ground restitutionary claims.4
48. Because valuations of property and services are subjective, the risk is
that the transformation will not be Pareto superior. The policy against recovery in restitution is therefore strongest when the donor of the benefit might
easily have eliminated this risk by seeking instructions from the beneficiary.
See, e.g., J.L. Carpenter Co. v. Richardson, 118 Conn. 322, 172 A. 226 (1934)
(mechanic performed additional work on motor boat that owner had left simply for a tune-up). But recovery is more likely to be permitted when the valuation problems are of diminished importance. Thus, restitution is nearly always
granted for a mistaken payment of money. See 3 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF
REsTrrUTION §§ 14.18-.19 (1978).
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How much harder it must be to derive a principle of fidelity to
promising; whose benefits are so much less focused than goods
or services in restitution. Did I receive a benefit from promissory institutions? Perhaps, instead of owing allegiance, I might
simply repay it, if I only knew to whom.
Given such valuation problems, Robert Nozick argues that
obligations of political allegiance may disappear altogether.49 A
similar difficulty besets benefits theories of promising. Suppose
one argues that she derives no benefit from the institution. She
may regard promising as less desirable than life in nonpromissory regimes. We cannot easily contradict her, so long as no
moral value is ascribed to promising. This kind of objection
could be handled without difficulty on a high-fidelity theory of
promising under which a subjective estimate of value can be
trumped by an objective measure of the benefit of an institution. But how could this be done on a low-fidelity theory? In
political philosophy, as in law, valuation uncertainties may prevent the resolution of substantive issues.
4.

Voluntary Acceptance

The objection based on valuation uncertainties may tell
more against benefits theories of political than of promissory
obligation. The benefits of promising, although not uncontestable, at least seem less controversial than the benefits of actual
governments. If promising offers prospective benefits, a present promisor might even be seen to have received benefits from
past promisors through their performances, which renders her
present promises more creditable.
Even if promisors are assumed to have derived a benefit
from the institution, however, it is difficult to see how the mere
receipt of benefits gives rise to duties of allegiance unless the
benefits are voluntarily accepted. Without such acceptance a
fidelity requirement may not be extracted merely by officiously
providing a person with a benefit, even if its desirability is conceded. Consider, for example, the case of a community about to
decide whether to take measures to reduce air pollution. Assume that the scheme's expected value exceeds its expected
costs and that for each member of the community it represents
a Pareto superior transformation. All recipients are asked to
contribute to the expense. Despite one person's objection, the
measure is carried out and air pollution is reduced without his
49.

See R. NOzIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 93-94 (1974).
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support. The dissenter's failure to contribute to the scheme
would justify his exclusion from its benefits. But if the benefits
are nonexcludable (as is likely the case with air pollution measures), no inclusionary rule arises even if the scheme is deemed
beneficial for each member of the society. In the same way, no
obligation of support arises through the receipt of the nonexcludable benefits of Eastern Standard Time, the market for corporate control, and French literature. Without having
voluntarily accepted benefits, one does not owe loyalty.50 Rawls
therefore excluded from the principle of fairness those
nonrejectable benefits which come whether we will them or
not.5 1 If these benefits, like clean air, cannot be rejected, it follows that they cannot feasibly be accepted by their recipients
without express consent.
A further difficulty of benefits theories of promising then
is that the benefits do not seem voluntarily accepted. Clearly
the general benefits of living in a promissory society do not
constitute an act of acceptance. At best the acceptance might
be found in the act of promising itself, in the knowledge that
promises are more likely to be relied on by virtue of performance by prior promisors. Such past performances are public
goods, inasmuch as they facilitate future reliance by other
promisees. If these benefits are accepted by promisors in their
promises, this may be thought sufficient to support the principle of fairness. These benefits, however, are scarcely more
50. See A.J. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 122 (Canadians do not owe allegiance to the United States simply because they, as well as Americans, derive
benefits from law enforcement in the United States); see also Arneson, The
Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 ETHIcs 616, 619 (1982)
("One cannot voluntarily accept a good one cannot voluntarily reject.").
It may be objected that such institutions seem less like active schemes of
social cooperation than the town meeting on air pollution. If principles of fairness were restricted to community meetings or joint enterprises, however,
they could scarcely explain the obligation to support a regime of promising.
There is, moreover, no compelling reason why a benefits theory should be so
limited, as long as some meaningful way exists of exhibiting an obligation of
fidelity to the institution. See A.J. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 104 (benefits
theories extend to broad range of schemes, programs, enterprises, and
institutions).
51. J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 111-12. Greenawalt has argued that voluntary acceptance is not required if the recipient is delighted to receive a benefit,
understands the cooperative scheme by which it is supplied, and thinks he or
she received a fair share. See Greenawalt, Promise, BenefJt and Need: Ties
that Bind Us to the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 727, 757 (1984). But if the recipient's
actual feelings are what matters, it is odd that fair-minded people should owe
obligations when ingrates do not. If the recipient's actual feelings do not matter, Greenawalt's theory is no different than that of Simmons.
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rejectable than the general material benefits available to those
who live in a promising society. 52
Assuming, however, that it were possible to reject promising, finding a voluntary acceptance of benefits in the act of
promising would greatly narrow the difference between benefits theories and contractarian explanations of promising.53 The
more that voluntariness is emphasized, the more closely the acceptance of benefits looks consensual. Consent theories, however, do not adequately explain promising.5 Furthermore, to
distinguish the principle of fairness from contractarian accounts of promising, it is necessary to posit a case in which benefits are voluntarily accepted but not consented to. John
Simmons attempts to give an example of this in a community
meeting to consider a clean water proposal. 55 One holdout announces that he wants nothing to do with the plan and votes
against it. The proposal nonetheless carries at the meeting, and
the community implements the plan. Unlike clean air, clean
water need not be accepted because it is available only to those
who take it from a particular well. This the holdout does, at
night so no one will see him. It is presumed that the benefits of
clean water cannot be excluded, in that the community cannot
prevent him from drawing water from the well. Enough exists
for everyone, and no one misses what he takes. He has not consented to the scheme, but Simmons concludes that an obliga56
tion of support arises from the acceptance of benefits.
Nozick's argument that a mere receipt of benefits without consent does not ground allegiance is thus alleged to be refuted.
Simmons's example is not well chosen, however, for the
holdout's removal of the water when he said he would have
nothing to do with the plan seems fraudulent. This example
does not support a principle of fidelity, but only, if at all, a duty
of nonfraudulent bargaining. In addition, even without the
holdout's misrepresentation of his intentions, Simmons's example is flawed by its failure to distinguish between the allocational and distributional effects of free riding in the
57
consumption of public goods.

52.

See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.

53. See A.J. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 124 (if principle of fairness binds
only those who have undertaken to support institution, it collapses into theory
of consent).
54. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
55. A.J. SIMMONS, Supra note 18, at 126-27.
56. Id. at 127.
57. A similar difficulty arises in Klosko's argument for a principle of fair-
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When an individual refuses to participate in collective action, two allocational consequences are possible. First, the
probability increases that the scheme will not be undertaken by
the remaining participants. Alternatively, if the scheme is implemented, there is a probability that it will not be on such a
large scale as it would have been had the individual joined in.58
This is undesirable if, on a high-fidelity perspective, the scheme
is one that should be supported. These ex ante considerations,
however, do not ground an obligation of fidelity if it is assumed
that the plan is ethically neutral.
In addition, if allocational considerations could support fidelity requirements on the receipt of rejectable goods (like
clean water), they would also do so when nonrejectable goods
(like clean air) were received. Allocational issues must be determined at the time of the meeting to approve the plan, not at
the later time when the holdout receives the benefits. If what
is important is the provision of public goods, fidelity becomes
important only at the meeting, when support is requested and
when the plan will succeed or fail. Thus, no difference exists
between the benefits of nonrejectable clean air and those of
rejectable clean water. A defection at the meeting might be fatal to either plan if it encourages more attempts at free riding
and the scheme eventually collapses. The defection might be
principled, based on a preference for an alternate scheme of
pollution control or perhaps for an entirely different cooperative scheme. But even in the hardest case, that of the defector
angling for a free ride, rejectable benefits cannot be distinguished from nonrejectable ones. An obligation of fidelity must
arise in both cases or in neither. If the obligation arises in both
cases, with no need for rejectability, the class of institutions to
which fidelity is owed would be impossibly broad. If neither
ness on the receipt of public goods that are "presumptively beneficial."
Klosko, Presumptive Benefit, Fairness,and PoliticalObligation, 16 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 241 (1987); Klosko, The Principle of Fairnessand Political Obligation, 97 ETHics 353 (1987) [hereinafter Klosko, The Principle of Fairness].
What Klosko means by presumptively beneficial goods are those needed to
maintain a minimally acceptable life. In such cases "the indispensability of the
goods overrides the outsider's usual right to choose if he wishes to cooperate."
Klosko, The Principle of Fairness,supra, at 355. If these benefits are deemed
morally good, the principle of fairness would collapse into a high-fidelity theory. See Simmons, The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor, 16
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 272 (1987). If not, Klosko's argument is subject to the
criticisms made in the following paragraphs.
58. See Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 359, 359-60 (1974).
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case generates fidelity requirements, then benefits theories
must fail.
Arguments for fidelity requirements on distributional theories are equally troubling. If the holdout makes clear at the
meeting that he will not contribute to the plan but will accept
its benefits, the other participants will have been put on notice
of his plans and will only proceed on that basis. If exclusion
from benefits were feasible, the holdout's refusal to participate
in the plan would certainly justify his exclusion from the benefits. If not feasible under present technology, the participants
might invest in the production of new technology that would
exclude the holdout. They might also seek to exclude him from
the benefits of other public goods to which he cannot claim an
entitlement. They cannot, however, claim that they are entitled to his support at the meeting.
Moreover, if distributional theories do not require the
holdout to support the plan at the meeting, nothing much
changes after the meeting when he takes water from the well.
The participants will have already reacted to his defection, and
the well will never run dry. This suggests that issues of distributional fairness, like those of allocational efficiency, should be
determined at the time of the meeting. If they were not, the
holdout would be wrong to take water from the well even if he
has warned the participants of his plans and the supply of
water is inexhaustible.
The principal reason why distributional arguments are unpersuasive, however, is that they suffer from an impoverished
view of social relations. Public goods are too many and too varied to speak of fidelity requirements on their receipt. Like
Blanche Dubois, we rely on the kindness of strangers, and in
unforeseen ways assist others, as Frank Capra showed us in It's
a Wonderful Life.59 These benefits must not be trivialized; if
they could be measured, they could well be as important as the
benefits of promising. Beyond kindness is the spillover effect
of ubiquitous public goods, like Richard Arneson's case of the
well-dressed person who walks down the street, providing pleasure to those who see her.60 Such benefits may be voluntarily
accepted so long as the viewer permits his gaze to settle on the
well-dressed person, but he could hardly be expected to choose
59.

Liberty Films, Inc. 1946.

60. Arneson, supra note 50, at 621; see also Simmons, Voluntarism and
PoliticalAssociations, 67 VA. L. REV. 19, 29 (1981) (receipt of spillover benefits
does not ground fidelity requirements).
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between looking away and owing an obligation. No one could
61
seriously suggest that a Rawlsian meter is running.
Benefits theories of fidelity to institutions are beset by
other difficulties, notably because of their static character.
Once benefits are received, one is bound forever and subsequent rejection of the institution is wrongful. Even the abandonment of promising by all other members of society would
not loosen one's ties to the institution if the obligation is owed
to past promisors. 62 A dynamic account of how new institutions
replace old ones would always begin with some first act of disloyalty, and each new institution, unless it arose out of thin air,
would be founded on treachery. Even the features of an institution would remain immobile. Either institutions would never
evolve or a theory based on loyalty would periodically require
disloyalty. If applied consistently, the principle of fairness
would inevitably offend under any regime of freedom of association that might reasonably be desired. For example, suppose
that, of two similar institutions, one provides greater benefits.
Surely recipients of benefits from the less desirable institution
would not be barred from adopting the first. Although I derive
benefits from the English language, I am free to enjoy them
without moral scruples and may even without any sense of
guilt abandon English for Norwegian the moment I find greater
benefits in doing so. It is absurd to suggest that when taking
benefits from such institutions, one should calculate nicely
whether such benefits have in fact been supported (and, if so,
to the requisite extent). One has the right to shop around, to
be fickle. So long as two institutions are ethically indistinguishable, no obligation of fidelity to either arises through a receipt
of benefits.
The receipt of benefits, therefore, does not suffice to
ground a duty of fidelity to promising. This is not to say that
every morally desirable enterprise should be supported without
regard to the voluntary acceptance of benefits. The absence of
a connecting factor may absolve one from obligations of alle61. This analysis does not mean to imply that public goods are never valuable. In fact, it is the low-fidelity theorist who refuses to ascribe moral worth
to them. This Article suggests that public goods may be morally desirable, and
if so they are best defended from a high-fidelity perspective. In such cases
they should be supported by all, without regard to the degree to which past
benefits were shared.
62. See R. SARTORIUS, INDMDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NoRMs 104
(1975) (criticizing fidelity requirements, based on past receipt of benefits even
though others generally do not cooperate).
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giance to just institutions. The lawyer who derives benefits
from a local bar association may feel obligated to support it.
She would: owe no such obligation to an association of dentists
even if both are desirable institutions. As promising illustrates,
however, duties of fidelity do not always require a special connecting factor. As a consequence the receipt of benefits is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for an obligation
of fidelity to promising.
5. Gratitude Theories
A final attempt at a benefits theory bases obligations of fidelity on gratitude for receipt of a benefit. It is, of course, difficult to speak of an obligation of gratitude, which in part is
simply a feeling rather than an action. In some cases the debt
of gratitude may even be requited with an expression of a feeling of gratitude. As Simmons notes, people have less control
over their feelings than over their actions, so an obligation to
feel grateful sounds odd.63 Moreover, even when gratitude

might lead one to some more positive action, it does not seem
correct to label this an obligation. What distinguishes a gift, for
which gratitude is appropriate, from mere self-seeking cooperative behavior is that a gift excludes obligations of reciprocity.6
In addition, if gifts alone call for gratitude, the idea of gratitude is not easily extended to institutional benefits. What is
needed are actual givers, quite apart from the institution itself:
the gift without the giver is bare. Institutional benefits, however, are scarcely gifts. In the case of promising, the institutional benefits are derived from past performances by other
promisors through which one's promise becomes more worthy
of belief. But if past promisors are the donors, their self-interested performances generally are not gifts to anyone.65 Without the instinct of charity, institutions such as promising are
not suitable objects for gratitude.
Furthermore, a gratitude theory of fidelity to promising
cannot succeed because gratitude is not an impersonal virtue,
but is rooted in the relationships that it permits to flourish. It
is part of a gift ceremony in which both donor and recipient
63. A.J. SMMONS, supra note 18, at 166-67.
64. See Lyons, The Odd Debt of Gratitude, 29 ANALYsIs 92, 92 (1969);
Smith, Is There a PrimaFacie Obligationto Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950,
953 (1973).
65. See A.J. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 187-89 (criticizing gratitude accounts of political obligations); Berger, Gratitude,85 ETHIcS 298, 300 (1975) (no
gratitude owed for contractual performance).
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demonstrate their bonds to each other. For this reason a want
of gratitude is most objectionable when the relationship is most
prized, as with family ties. Similarly, the recipient who may
rightly reject the relationship does not have to show gratitude
for the gift.6 6 What then is important is whether the relationship should be upheld. Thus, gratitude for the benefits of a
promising regime is appropriate only if a case can be made for
promising on other grounds, as when the institution is thought
just in itself. Although this might justify duties of high fidelity,
it does not support low-fidelity obligations.
C. PROMISEE-BASED THEORIES: RELIANCE
1. Duty of Respect
Reliance theories of promising are based on the foreseeable
harm to promisees if promises are not kept. Because he trusted
the promisor and acted upon the promise, the promisee is
worse off on breach than he would have been had the promise
never been made. 67 Under these circumstances the requirement of allegiance reduces to a duty to prevent harm from
coming to those who rely on a person who breaches her
promise.
Reliance theories are circular when applied in defense of
high-fidelity duties. If the institution does not exist, it cannot
be justified through promissory reliance, for promisees would
not have relied in the same way on promises without the obligations generated by the institution. 68 Promisees would simply
adjust their actions in accordance with their lessened expectation of performance and would have only themselves to blame
for overreliance. Breach would not be an occasion for moral
concern unless it were thought ethically desirable to resolve informational disparities concerning the likelihood of performance. This, however, would require endowing the institution of
promising with moral status without regard to whether reliance
66. See L. HYDE, THE GIFt: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTic LIFE OF PROPERTY 70-73 (1979) (gifts should be refused when acceptance would establish inappropriate relationship to giver).
67. "My statement is like a pit I have dug in the road, into which you
fall." C. FRIED, supra note 6, at 10.
68. This circularity has been described as a "secret paradox of the common law," see P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAw 38 (1981) (arguing that
this secret paradox is largely historical), but this difficulty with reliance theories was well known to some of their earliest proponents. See, e.g., Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 59-60
(1936).
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interests are affected. 6 9
Although reliance theories do not support high-fidelity duties, they do generate low-fidelity duties to support the institution. A convention requires a minimal respect, if not
allegiance, so long as any harm may come to another through
an assumption that one is acting according to it. When driving
in a foreign country, for example, I should learn on which side
of the road to drive, and not merely for my own sake. So too, a
visitor to Canada from a nonpromissory society has a duty of fidelity to ensure that no one mistakenly believes she is promising. Thus, an inclusionary H-rule of respect arises, under which
one is bound to take reasonable care to inform oneself of a society's conventions and to ensure that other members of society
are not misled as to one's participation in them. This duty of
respect can be distinguished from the more exacting requirements of allegiance. The duty is not imposed on everyone, but
only on those in sufficient proximity to the society in which the
convention is found to give rise to a risk of harm. The duty is
therefore one of low fidelity.
In the case of promising, the duty of respect requires one to
tread warily around the institution's borders, lest others come
to harm. Breach of the duty may invoke a tortious regime of
sanctions premised on promisee reliance. In other cases the
sanctions may be found within promissory C-rules, and transgressors may become promisors. 70 If one were bound to take
care to learn the convention, one would also know when it
binds one. A duty to respect the institution by performing
promises or abstaining from promising thus arises. Because opting out of promising in a promissory society is virtually impossible, 71 the duty to perform or abstain generally collapses into a
duty of performance.
69. An institution of quasi promising may survive despite a lack of moral
sanctions. Promisors might have strong prudential reasons to perform, insofar
as a reputation for trustworthiness raises the inference that cooperative behavior will be repeated in the future. MacCormick is undoubtedly correct in
pointing out that, for this reason, a reliance theory of quasi promising need not
presuppose a convention that promises are regarded as binding. MacCormick,
Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers I, 46 ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 59,
62-69 (Supp. 1972). But if promises do not create an obligation, a reliance theory cannot be advanced to explain why they ought to do so. In addition, as
MacCormick notes, the likelihood of reliance is far greater given the existence
of a convention of morally binding promises. Id. at 72.
70. The result is, of course, an objective theory of contracts, in which
promissory obligations may attach to fraudulent or negligent promisors. See
supra note 31.
71. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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This reliance-based explanation of low fidelity avoids the
circle into which high-fidelity duties lead. The perform or abstain requirement assumes the existence both of the convention
and of an obligation to prevent other parties from being
harmed by relying on one's participation in it. Moreover, it is
usually beside the point to argue that such promisee reliance as
arises in a society is undesirable. Even if greater self-reliance
by the promisee might be preferred, this ordinarily is irrelevant
if his behavior was reasonable by his society's conventions.
Under the duty of respect, one generally takes one's conven72
tions as one finds them.
A promise thus may be extracted from patterns of reliant
behavior. Suppose, for example, that a practice has developed
whereby a friend drives me home from work each night. My
friend has never formally undertaken to do so, but he and I
both know that I have come to expect a ride and that by waiting for him I miss the last bus home. One day he leaves early
without telling me. I might legitimately be upset by my
friend's behavior and complain that he broke a tacit promise to
give me a lift (or at least to warn me to find alternative transportation home). In contrast to this example, however, other
examples of reliance clearly do not import an obligation. The
burghers who set their watches by Immanuel Kant's walks relied on him but could not have been heard to complain if Kant
had altered his habits. Reliance, therefore, may not be a sufficient condition for a promissory obligation.
It is necessary to find some way to distinguish these two
kinds of reliance so that only the first gives rise to a promise.
It might then be suggested that questions about fidelity should
focus on the something else that differentiates the first example from the second. 73 But this mistakes a justification of an
inclusionary H-rule with a description of the institution's Crules. The difference between justified and unjustified reliance
may simply be that, under promissory C-rules, one act counts
as a promise while the other does not. An explanation of this
difference may refer to the institutional values of promissory
regimes, which prescribe its contours. Once a convention ex72. In an extreme case, the convention may be so unjust that opting out is
permitted in spite of reliance. In other cases the more proper course is to
warn those who might rely, rather than to instill self-reliance the hard way.
73. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 68, at 64-68, 127-29 (extra element as
compliance with socially accepted values).

1988]

CONTRACT THEORIES

ists, however, an inclusionary rule can be found in a duty of
respect.
2. Promissory C-rules
Notwithstanding that reliance theories provide an explanation for requirements of low fidelity, these theories remain implausible insofar as they fail to offer a satisfactory account of
the contours of promising. Duties of respect do not oblige without promisee reliance, and for this reason reliance theorists
cannot explain why a promise remains binding even if the
promisee has not relied in any way. To meet this objection, reliance theorists may prefer to focus on the vindication of the
promisee's reasonable expectations. Here too, however, the
theory remains unpersuasive. If it simply means that, on every
promise, the promisee ought to have expected performance, the
theory is tautological. If instead it limits promissory obligations
to cases in which the promisee did expect performance, the theory does not offer an adequate account of promising. Reliance
theorists like Patrick Atiyah must therefore gerrymander their
C-rules, redrawing the boundaries of the convention so that
promises do not take without reliance. 74 But this is plainly
wrong. A promisor's obligation to perform is not excused,
either in morals or in law, if the promisee did not believe her. 75
For this reason, reliance theories do not provide a satisfactory
explanation of promising, as they can of quasi-promissory institutions like estoppel.
The unrelied-on promise provides another insight into inclusionary H-rules. Without fidelity requirements a conscientious objector to promising might promise and fail to perform
in an effort to destroy the institution. This would be wrong
under an H-rule of respect, but respect requirements cannot explain why promises are binding even when there is no reliance.
This' portion of promissory C-rules then requires its own Hrule. Once again, unless the C-rule is linked to people, its obligations do not bind individuals.
III. HIGH-FIDELITY REQUIREMENTS
Given the failure of low-fidelity theories, the only plausible
74. See id. at 52-59; see also Mack, Rights, Liberties, and Expectations: A
Reply to Sterba and Markie, 89 ETmIcs 301, 303 (1979) (promises binding only
with reliance by promisee).
75. See Markie, Mack on Promises and NaturalRights, 88 ETMIcs 263, 264
(1978) (promises binding even without reliance).
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justification for promissory institutions is a high-fidelity one in

which the source of the allegiance requirement is found in natural duties to support just institutions. Although some just
conventions do not command fidelity without a connecting factor, others may bind individuals even if nothing links them to
the convention. This is because the institution itself may deserve support, either for the good that results from it on a consequentialist theory or for some intrinsic feature of the
convention on a rights theory.
A. FoRms OF JUSTIFICATION
1. Argument from Inevitability
A justification for a high-fidelity obligation requires that an
ethical case be made for the institution. At first glance it might
be thought odd to search for a justification for a normative convention: how does one part of our moral language support another part? What might be behind this concern is that a moral
justification for morality cannot be given. Prudential, nonmoral reasons for moral rules are possible in terms of consequences not deemed good in themselves. But if morality is good
for a particular reason, why is that reason good? On the other
hand, if a justification of morality as a whole must be circular, a
noncircular justification may be possible for certain features of
a moral system, like promise keeping. A morally desirable institution could then be justified by its more fundamental good
consequences. Must we suppose that in ethical spheres there is
only the good (which cannot be justified) and that which is justified (which cannot be good)?
A more serious critique of promissory theory claims that
the institution is so necessarily a part of our society that no justification is required. This objection from inevitability argues
that nonpromissory societies cannot exist and concludes that
76
promising must be accepted as a necessary social convention.
This argument does not generate an ethical defense of fidelity
requirements, for that would amount to drawing an evaluative
conclusion from a descriptive premise. It suggests, however,
that inclusionary H-rules are not required when defection is
impossible.
The challenge of such arguments, therefore, is to produce
an intelligible account of a rebellion against promising. Admit76. See, e.g., Hanfling, supra note 32, at 26-27; Midgley, supra note 10, at
252; Pitkin, supra note 41, at 48.
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tedly, refraining from promising in a promissory society would
be extraordinarily difficult. Suppose, however, that defectors
consider nonpromissory regimes to be in every way superior to
promissory societies. Thinking that promising is evil, they
might promise and systematically refuse to perform in an effort
to hasten the convention's fall. This behavior would be wrongful if it could be established that they owed the institution allegiance. Whether the rejection of promising is wrongful or not,
however, it remains intelligible. Nor could defectors be granted
the right to opt out of the convention and yet be told that their
promises ought to be performed. Every promissory ought thus
requires a principle of fidelity for both rebels from and supporters of the institution. If the promisor is bound to perform, this
must be by virtue of an inclusionary H-rule. Such a rule may
arise because of the moral value of the institution even if the
promisor thinks it unjust.
In addition, the argument that promising is a necessary
convention is undercut by the fact that a society without promising does exist. Tonga is a Pacific monarchy that lies east of
Fiji and south of Samoa. Several scholars have documented its
customs, which are worthy of study even apart from the undoubted incentive to conduct a field trip there.7 7 One of the
more idiosyncratic customs in Tonga is the meaning of
promises. Although several Tonganese words mean something
like promising, none give rise to a moral obligation to perform . 8 Nevertheless, Tongan society places great importance
on the maintenance of personal relationships and on reciprocal
acts of assistance. A Tonganese promise is a recognition of solidarity, with the intention to assist in the future evidencing a
77. Tonga first came under European influence in the eighteenth century.
Captain Cook visited it in 1773 and, with a Westerner's ignorance of native
feeling, named it the Friendly Islands. He was apparently unaware that the
Tongans were plotting to assassinate him and his crew and that they were
saved only because of tribal disagreements as to whether this should be done
by day or by night. S. LATOKEFu, CHURCH AND STATE IN TONGA 12 (1974). He
may also not have noticed the Tongan penchant for cannibalism and the strangling of widows. Id. See generally Korn & Korn, Where People Don't Promise, 93 ETHICS 445 (1983); K. Morton, Kinship, Economics, and Exchange in a
Tongan Village (Sept. 1972) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, avail-

able from University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
78. Korn & Korn, supra note 77, at 446-47; see also H. MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 312 (15th ed. 1894) ("No trustworthy primitive record can be read without perceiving that the habit of mind which induces us to make good a promise
is as yet imperfectly developed, and that acts of flagrant perfidy are often
mentioned without blame and sometimes described with approbation.").
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present desire to maintain a relationship.79 But the future is
uncertain, and if performance becomes difficult it may be omitted without moral sanction. 0 The greater probability of future
breach in Tonga must then be balanced against the less easily
quantifiable benefits of living in a society whose institutions
suggest a heightened concern for present expressions of sympathy and concern. Compared to the advantages of promising,
those advantages may not seem compelling, but at least a nonpromissory society exists.
A second argument from inevitability is that an inquiry
into the values of promissory regimes is unnecessary because of
the institution's evident desirability. Under this theory nonpromissory institutions are regarded as so repellant that everyone would reject them, with no need to explore the basis for
doing so. For example, imagine a nonpromising society called
the Kingdom of Natural Duty. Here promising is excluded not
through some feature of the language, as in Tonga, but because
of the breadth of preexisting natural duties. If contract is to be
squeezed out in this way, putative promisors cannot be allowed
any room to maneuver, with all their waking moments filled in
the performance of some duty. In the land of Natural Duty,
that which is not prohibited is made compulsory. Contract is
eliminated because it is meaningless to say that one assumes an
obligation to do that which one already has a duty to perform.
Promising regimes clearly are incompatible with realms of
Natural Duty, for if all future actions are accounted for, nothing remains to promise. From this, Hart concludes that the
existence of a promissory regime implies a range of personal
liberty as to future action. 8 ' Because he believes promising to
be a universal practice, Hart describes the promisor's ability to
arrange future affairs as a natural right. 82
Hart's argument is subject to the same weaknesses as other
attempts to derive moral conclusions from empirical premises.
In addition, were it (wrongly) taken as a defense of promising,
it would be quite misleading. If promising implies liberty, it
does not follow that liberty implies promising.83 A rejection of
79.

Korn & Korn, supra note 77, at 448-49.

80. Id. at 449.
81. See Hart, supra note 8, at 183-84.
82. See id. at 184 (promisor's ability to create future obligation follows
from natural right of freedom).
83. One may even be troubled by the restrictions on choice that arise
through the act of promising. See M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHIcS OF LIBERTY 13348 (1982) (because promises restrict liberty, no contract should be enforced ex-
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the realm of Natural Duty need not lead to promising. One
might also end up in Tonga. In both Tonga and the Kingdom of
Natural Duty, the law of civil obligations is restricted essentially to tort. Despite this similarity, the two societies differ in
the scope of their tortious regimes, with considerably fewer requirements in Tonga than in the land of Natural Duty. While
in Tonga the scope of tort law can be more expansive than that
found in promissory societies, it may also be less so. (The Gulag is after all a promissory society.) Nonpromissory regimes
need not, therefore, place as many restrictions on human choice
as do Western states, and promissory regimes cannot be justified as essential to liberty. Instead, a defense of promising requires a discriminating analysis of the institution's advantages.
2.

Rights and Consequentialist Theories

High-fidelity explanations of natural duties of fidelity seek
to justify promising from the perspective of either theories of
rights or of consequences. Neoformalism, an example of a
rights theory, values promising for the choices it facilitates,
whatever the consequences. Consequentialist theories value
promising for its consequences, taking into account how they
are produced. With respect to promissory institutions, the most
plausible version of consequentialism is utilitarianism.
Although neoformalism focuses on the choices involved in
promising, such theories are devoid of content if they totally ignore consequences. Choosing in total ignorance of consecept transfers of property); Macneil, Values in Contract,supra note 6, at 35659 (enforcing promises that reduce future options is inconsistent with valuing
free choice). The paradox of freedom that free choice in promising gives us
the liberty to bind ourselves is the basis for the tension in the commercial exchanges of Venice and the matrimonial ones of Belmont, for, like Antonio's
bond, Portia's promise was also a sale of her person. See W. SHAKESPEARE,
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act Im, sc. ii, 16-18 (W. Merchant ed. 1967); M.
SHELT, MONEY, LANGUAGE, AND THOUGHT 81 (1982) ("The beautiful marriage
bond is not far removed from the ugly bond that made it possible in the first
place."). In the end the tensions remain, and for want of a resolution in tragedy we are given the palliative of comedy (mistaken identity of
Portia-Balthasar).
These concerns dissipate when it is realized that promises are but one
kind of bonding technique and that self-control theories provide numerous examples of unobjectionable methods by which an individual may restrict future
choices. If promises are suspect for this reason, alarm clocks are dangerous as
well. On self-control theories, see T. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE
57-112 (1984) (describing theories of self-command and their relation to ethics
and law); Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357, 36173 (1985) (describing self-imposed rules designed to improve individual

behavior).
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quences would be like pushing a button without knowing
where the current leads. Unlike the consequentialist, however,
a neoformalist deliberately cuts off evidence of remote consequences when rights are concerned. Once the immediate consequences are known and the act can be identified, a choice that
respects the rights of moral actors is preferred to one that produces a better end state but that violates those rights. The priority of rights over good end states is lexicographic in that no
end state, however desirable, outweighs the observance of a
right. Without the possibility of a trade-off between rights and
consequences, evidence of probable end states is entirely irrelevant when a right is invoked.
Notions of the right and the good seem to color our ethical
intuitions of many moral issues, and we may then be led to
search for some overarching theory that unties these two
strands of our moral ideas.84 It may be suggested, for example,
that rights may be relaxed in the face of monstrous consequences. 8 5 If so, this may be thought to involve something less
than a total abandonment of rights theories, which might continue to serve for less dramatic moral questions. Alternatively,
the consequentialist need not be indifferent to procedural rules
with a rights component in selecting end states. In choosing a
course of action, one also selects the path that leads there. If
this involves abridging some right, the consequentialist must
take that into consideration.8 6 Moreover, the violation of a
right should be weighed not merely from the perspective of the
party directly injured, but more generally in terms of the precedent value of the breach. For example, a breach of promise
may render the institution of promising more unstable for
other parties in the future. In this way end states that would
otherwise be desirable might be qualified as bad for their
spillover effects.
These attempts at synthesis may seem to be headed in the
right direction, being better able to accommodate ordinary feel84. For several suggestions as to how this might be accomplished, see R.
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 494-98 (1981). The same author's An-

archy, State, and Utopia, however, was nonconsequentialist in its approach to
questions of political obligation. See R. NOZICK, supra note 49, at 26-53.
85. For example, this is suggested by Fried in his concept of catastrophic
cases, those "extreme situations in which the usual categories of judgment (including the category of right and wrong) no longer apply." C. FRIED, supra
note 15, at 10.
86. "Mattering as a means is a way of mattering." D. PARFIT, supra note
2, at 46. A society whose citizens act rightly may also be taken as one of the
ends posited as good by consequentialist theories. Id. at 48-49.
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ings of justice than unreconstructed rights or consequentialist
theories might. But what works in practice may not work in
theory. The first suggestion-rights theories for ordinary cases,
consequentialist for exceptions-simply raises the question of
how the border between the two kinds of moral questions is established. If rights are like tunnels, so that only small cars pass
through, the distinction between the two kinds of theories is
moved back one step, where the height is established and
where only one kind of theory is possible. As for the second
suggestion, a consequentialist theory of rights must always refer to end-state consequences if rights are abridged, for information about the consequences of an ascription of rights cannot
be shut out. Thus, every moral theory must be either a rights
or consequentialist one insofar as it would exclude or admit evidence of remote consequences in moral decisions.
B. NEOFORMALIST THEORIES
The case for a natural duty of fidelity therefore must rest
on either a rights or a consequentialist ethical theory.
Neoformalist explanations of promising, based on concepts of
rights, are considerably less persuasive than consequentialist
theories for two reasons. Neoformalism cannot plausibly indicate when a regime of contracts ends, at the border of the doctrine of illegality. In addition, neoformalism cannot explain
why promising, of all institutions, should be valued.
1. Limits of Contract
The first objection to neoformalism is that it fails to account for the circumstances when promises ought not to be performed, as under the doctrine of illegality. Of course, a rights
theorist need not argue that every promise should be
performed, in the way that Kant believed that lying was never
justified.8 7 When promises impose burdensome costs on third
parties, for example, they might simply not count as promises,
thus eliminating the apparent counterexample. But what of
the promise that is unobjectionable when made and whose external costs become apparent only at the time of performance?
From a neoformalist perspective, how can present promissory
87. See I. KANT, On a Supposed Right tp Tell Lies from AltruisticMotives,

in CRIIQUE OF PRACCAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGs IN MORAL PHILOSO-

PHY 346, 347-48 (L. Beck trans. 1949). For a recent statement of Benjamin
Constant's argument that lying to liars or murderers is justified, see C. FRIED,

supra note 15, at 69-78.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[l
[Vol.
72:775

rights be trumped by remote consequences? If the change of
circumstances affected only the two parties, it might be argued
that the problem could be resolved through a hypothetical consent to efficient breaches. Relating the changed circumstances
to the original promise seems a little artificial, however, and in
any event this move seems even more fictitious when third parties suffer the disastrous consequences. Performance of such
promises may be forbidden by consequentialist theories, but
from the perspective of rights, an implied consent to avoid unpleasant consequences does not seem possible without abandoning neoformalism. It is, however, easy to imagine examples
in which this feature of rights theories is uncomfortably
absolutist.
The major weakness of any rights theory of ethics now becomes visible. It is not that rules are established in spite of
their consequences, but that they are prescribed in ignorance of
them. A disregard of known consequences might seem, at an
intuitive level, a part of the price paid to protect rights. This
kind of thinking may lead one, like Charles Fried, to propose a
measure of consequentialism in extreme cases, in which the
cost of respecting rights is too high.8 8 Such suggestions, however, reveal a misunderstanding of the distinction between the
two ethical theories. In excluding as irrelevant any evidence of
remote results of an ascription of rights, neoformalism requires
ethical decisions to be made at a time when extreme consequences cannot be distinguished from moderate ones. The
theory of rights must be formed in the face of unknown consequences. From behind the veil of ignorance, the moral actor is
permitted to anticipate the worst.
2.

Fidelity to a Convention

The second objection to neoformalism is its failure to provide a justification of promising that takes account of its conventional nature. What must be shown is why this convention
is desirable. Two such arguments must be considered. Promising may first be thought to provide greater freedom by expanding the domain of alternatives. On the other hand,
adopting the institution might be seen to offer a more focused
set of advantages under which the kind of alternatives available
under the institution matter. Both of these explanations ultimately reduce to consequentialism.
88.

See supra note 85.
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At first glance it might seem easy enough to ground a
neoformalist defense of promising in the greater range of action
in promissory than in nonpromissory societies. There is one
thing that can be done in promissory but not in nonpromissory
societies, and that is to make a promise. The expansion of the
domain of alternatives in this way offers more choices, with the
case for promising resting on a simple affirmation of libertarian

values.
This argument has a superficial appeal. While liberty may
mean many different things, in part it does implicate the
number of available alternatives.8 9 With only one member in
the class of alternatives, no real choice is possible. Suppose, for
example, that one cannot leave his house because a large boulder blocks the only exit. Surely he need not know whether the
rock was placed there by human hand or by nature before he
can say whether his liberty has been restricted.90 On the other
hand, not every increase in the domain of alternatives results in
an expansion of liberty. The mugging victim has alternatives
(the highwayman's "your money or your life"), but neither is
very pleasant. When the alternative is undesirable or not pre89. Thus, Locke believed that "the end of law is not to abolish or restrain,
but to preserve and enlarge freedom." Locke, supra note 29, at 33. For discussions of the relation between liberty and the domain of alternatives, see Jones
& Sugden, Evaluating Choice, 2 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 47, 47-57 (1982); Beavis
& Rowley, Evaluating Choice: A Note, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 79, 79-81
(1983); Jones & Sugden, EvaluatingChoice: A Reply, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
85, 85-87 (1983).
90. From a utilitarian perspective, the distinction between negative freedom, by which only actual coercion restricts liberty, and positive freedom is
suspect. Theories of positive and negative freedom are most closely associated
with I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 7-19 (1958), although they may be
traced back to Saint Augustine's distinction between the freedom to choose
and the freedom to choose rightly. ST. AUGUSTINE, ENCHnRIION § 30 (E.
Evans trans. 1953) (Benedictine Folio ed. 1701). For arguments that the man
confined to his house by the boulder is free, see F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION
OF LIBERTY 12-13 (1960) (distinguishing freedom of choice from range of physical possibilities); Miller, Constraints on Freedom, 94 ETHIcS 66, 68-70 (1983)
(distinguishing between freedom and ability to do an act).
In this Article positive freedom is identified with the size of the domain of
alternatives and with the quality of the choices offered. See, e.g., Regan, Paternalism, Freedom, Identity, and Commitment, in PATERNALISM, supra note 7,
at 113, 116-21 (discussing freedom-maximization principle). More frequently,
however, positive freedom is taken to refer to the deliberative quality of the
choice, see Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1132-38 (paternalistic regulation does not
curtail but enhances liberty if process norms are served), or to self-realization
norms, see C. TAYLOR, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 211, 215-16 (1985) (directing action toward goal of
self-realization does not curtail but enhances liberty).
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ferred to existing alternatives, its effect on the realm of liberty
is at best neutral. In addition, Nozick clearly is right in suggesting that two choices may both be described as free even if
the relevant domains differ in size. 9 1 Liberty is not measured
simply by counting up alternatives with no consideration of the
kinds of choices available.92
The mere expansion of the domain of alternatives through
the adoption of a convention of promising is then not enough to
justify the institution from a libertarian perspective. It is true
that, before the institution existed, one could not promise. And
before Abner Doubleday, one could not play baseball. But
surely no burst of liberty occurred when baseball was invented.
A neoformalist justification of an institution therefore requires
not only that new forms of activity be made possible when a
convention is adopted by a society, but also that the convention
increases liberty in a significant way.
In addition, a rights theorist cannot prefer promising to
other conventions on the basis of its consequences. If, for example, promises are thought to generate more wealth than
baseball, this merely provides a prudential reason for valuing
the former institution more than the latter. From a rights perspective, the explanation of the importance of promising must
focus on abstract rights and ignore end-state considerations.
Imagine, therefore, that the consequences of adopting promissory institutions are not benign; instead, a realm of spontaneous
disorder ensues. We must understand that, even here, the
neoformalist's support for promising continues unabated, lest
rights be thought parasitic upon ends.
Neoformalist theories therefore must explain, without reference to its consequences, why promising should be valued
over other conventions. One response to this challenge might
be to argue that a priority attaches to promissory institutions
because they permit obligations to be incurred. There are, however, a variety of ways, not now available, in which obligations
could arise. The easiest example of this is vows, conceived of as
91. See R. NOZICK, supra note 49, at 263-64.
92. It may be objected here that the weighing of two sets of alternatives is
a hopeless task. In many cases this may be so, such that both states might be
qualified as free. But in other circumstances it is not implausible to suggest
that some alternatives may be thought trivial and others significant. In dwelling on the choices open to one chained to a column, Lord Byron did not persuade us that the Prisoner of Chillon was in any sense free. See Regan, supra
note 90, at 119-20 (ranking of qualities of alternatives may be amenable to acceptable intuitive judgments).
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promises to oneself, not to God. Although vows could easily
give rise to moral or legal obligations,9 3 given the right kind of
institutions, they currently do not. Suppose, for example, that
someone writes a note to herself in which she vows not to start
smoking. In spite of the note, she smokes. She may be mildly
reproved for this, but she will not be faulted more because she
wrote the note. As a consequence promising cannot be prized
as an obligation-creating institution without a further explanation of why that kind of obligation is valuable.
There is, moreover, a further reason why no unique advantage attaches to promising as an obligation-creating institution.
This is because promises are content independent, conferring a
moral quality to the object of the promise because of the promise and not because of the object itself.94 The fact of promising,
not the substance of the promise, creates the moral obligation.
Promising is not justified by its obligations; rather, the obligations are justified by the promises behind them.
The neoformalist may also attempt to explain the particular advantages of promising by assimilating the institution to
property law: the obligation is reified and made the subject of
transfer to the promisee. 95 When I promise, I sell you the right
to my performance. Nonpromissory regimes are then seen as
ones in which such forms of property are inalienable, and the
93. On the Roman law of vows, see 12 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & L.
BARDE, TRAITt THIORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT cIviL § 28 at 36 n.3 (3d ed.
1906); see also R. WORMs, DE LA VOLONTt UNILATRALE CONSID..R.E COMME
SOURCE D'OBLIGATIONS 41-79 (1891) (discussing promises to a city and to a god).
Vows as self-control tactics are discussed in T. SCHELLING, supra note 83, at 99107.
94. H.L.A. Hart introduced the concept of "independence of content" in
Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 82, 102
(A. Melden ed. 1958); see also Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2), 46 ARiTOTELiAN SOC'Y 79, 95-98 (Supp. 1972) (discussing arguments
that justify norms).
95. The justification of legally binding promises on the analogy of property transfers is most clearly made by Grotius, who argued that the right to a
property transfer or to performance of some action by the promisor may itself
constitute property and that private ownership entails full rights of alienation.
2 H. GROTIUS, 2 DE JURE BELLI Ex PACIS ch. XI, 1, 3, at 33 (W. Whewell trans.
1853) (1625); 1 id. at ch. VI, I, 1, at 340; see also Benson, The Executory Contract in NaturalLaw: A Theory of the Right in Contract 26-32 (unpublished
manuscript on file at Minnesota Law Review) (explaining Grotius's analogy
equating a perfect promise with the transfer of property). I understand Kant
to have adopted a similar explanation of promissory obligations. See I. KANT,
THE PHILOsOPHY OF LAW 65, 104-05 (W. Hastie trans. 1887) (promises give one
possession of will of another); see also Barnett, supra note 4, at 291-300 (contractual obligations arise from consent to transfer of alienable entitlements or
rights).
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justification of promising comes down to a rejection of paternal-

ism, in the form of restrictions on alienation.
The analogy to property is not entirely unreasonable. Balance sheets would look quite different if promises were discounted from assets and liabilities. It remains unclear,
however, why such assets must be alienable on a theory of
rights. What is needed is a counterargument to the paternalist
who would prevent the alienation of promissory obligations. If
some restrictions on choice are to be permitted, the theory
must distinguish proper from improper paternalism. Here,
however, neoformalism seems bound to a treadmill, beyond a
bare assertion that these kinds of assets ought to be alienable.
Moreover, even the neoformalist libertarian who rejects any
form of paternalism seems not to have a convincing argument
for the superiority of promising to other institutions-baseball,
for example.9 6 The ability to imagine one institution as a property right more easily than another hardly moves the argument
forward. For example, other rights (the right to associate with
eight other people on a team) are better suited to baseball than
promising. There are even property regimes, in which baseball
teams are sold, better suited to baseball than promising. What
is missing then is an explanation why this kind of property
should be alienable. 97 And that question logically cannot be
answered merely through an analogy to property.
The last attempt at a neoformalist justification of promising focuses upon the virtue of trust fostered by the institution.
Fried has argued that a respect for informed human choice
mandates upholding the institution of truth telling,98 and in
Contract as Promise he applies the same analysis to promising.99 His defense of promising is, however, less plausible than
96. Some libertarians, like Murray Rothbard, would indeed prefer baseball, for legally binding promises are troubling under the paradox of freedom.
But see supra note 83 (self-control tactics also permit individuals to fetter
themselves, and these tactics cannot reasonably be thought objectionable).
97. This was the basis upon which Mill rejected the Kantian analysis of
promising, under which the duty to perform rested on a perceived inability to
make a universal law of promise breaking, because the institution then would
not survive. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 18-19

(L. Beck trans. 1959). But all that this shows, as Mill noted, is that the consequences of the adoption of such a rule would be undesirable. See J.S. MILL
Utilitarianism, in 10 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 203, 207 (J.
Robson ed. 1969).
98. C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 63 ("The foundational values of freedom
and rationality imply the foundational value of truth, for the rational man is
the one who judges aright, that is, truly.").
99. C. FRIED, supra note 6, at 16-17.
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his theory of truth telling, for it is harder to ascribe a foundational status to promissory trust. If moral choice must be informed to be meaningful, it is not clear why such knowledge
must extend to future action by others. Are Tongans, lacking
these foundations, unfree and irrational or less responsible in
their moral choices? Surely notions of moral praise or blame
are not inappropriate in nonpromissory societies.
The problem with the argument from trust is similar to
that faced by neoformalists in their analogies to property regimes. It provides no explanation of why this kind of trust
should be promoted, as opposed to the reliance that arises between teammates in baseball (Tinker to Evers to Chance).
Doubtless, promissory trust produces more material wealth, but
this kind of prudential reason counts as nothing in neoformalism, which must look to something intrinsic to promissory conventions as opposed to baseball conventions. What then is that
essence of promising, shorn of its consequences, which leads
one to prefer it to baseball? Trust arises through patterns of
cooperative behavior, which in turn may be a by-product of almost any convention. How then is trust assayed, so that between conventions the quality (or quantity) of various kinds of
trust can be compared? By dollars? To be sure, promissory
trust is more important than baseball trust. But does this refer
to anything more than the consequences of favoring one institution over another?
Furthermore, the adoption of promising in a nonpromissory regime might lead in part to unpleasant consequences.
Might not some negative externalities arise with so fundamental an institution? The claim that Tongan society better promotes communitarian virtues should not be rejected out of
hand. More trust may come only at a cost, as other features of
society change in the new regime. In particular, if the abstract
value of a regime of trust stems from the interpersonal relationships that it permits to flourish, it must be relevant to ask
whether the adoption of promising might in some way weaken
ties to one's fellowman. 00
100. There is another reason why a rights theory of the contours of contract law is unstable. As consequences become less remote, the parties might
be expected through private contracting to alter the C-rules of the neoformalist regime if it departed from consequentialist norms. Indeed, the parties could not be prevented from doing so under any theory whose primary
tenet is the value of human choice. Imagine, therefore, how rights theorists
would select the kinds of conduct to be actionable for misrepresentation. For
example, where on the continuum between fraud and nondisclosure is conduct
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Consequentialist theories of promising must ground fidelity
requirements on the superiority of promissory to nonpromissory societies. In examining end-state justifications of the institution, one manner of proceeding would be first to identify
what counts as a good consequence and then to examine how it
figures in a promissory regime. Although this might seem the
most direct path, the circuitous route sometimes leads more
quickly to one's goal. Thus, this Article questions the consequences of adopting the institution and assumes that they are
morally desirable. There may be many other plausible concepts
of the good, but I seek only those that might justify promising
and contract law.
While the best known variant of consequentialism is utilitarianism, a consequentialist position is not necessarily utilitarian. For example, a complete contingent theory might rank all
possible end states without inquiring as to their place in the felicific calculus. Alternatively, other goods, such as end states
characterized by particular virtues, may be the desiderata. A
consequentialist thus may prefer a choice leading to an end
state that leaves its members with less average or total utility
than is available through another choice.1 0 '
Apart from spillover effects, the direct product of promising is the disclosure of information concerning the promisor's
likelihood of performance. The assumption of a moral obligation, like that of a legal obligation when civil remedies for
breach are attached, may assist in resolving the informational
disparity between promisor and promisee as to performance. 0 2
Higher quality promises may be made when the consequences
of breach are more painful to the promisor. In this way a
promisee who is not satisfied by the promisor's statement of intention may ask, "But do you promise?," thereby raising the
stakes on breach. Promising operates, both on moral and legal
levels, as a bonding technique. Without it, substitutes for promwrongful? Suppose that the choice of fraud standards is to be made at a time
before the consequences are known, but that the parties are subsequently told
the economic consequences of their decision. Must any attempt on their part to
reallocate disclosure duties now be resisted?
101. See D. PARFiT, supra note 2, at 26-27 (pluralist consequentialism appeals to several different concepts of what constitutes a good outcome).
102. For a discussion of this signalling explanation of guarantees as a response to informational asymmetries, see Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons"
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 499 (1970).
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ising may arise, such as third-party guarantees and performance bonds. 10 3 Stable firms may also make more creditable
promisors if they have acquired a reputation for performance.' 0 4 But these devices will not wholly take the place of
promising in promissory regimes.
The advantage to promisees of information concerning the
possibility of performance is that it permits greater reliance (or
trust). The promisor will respond to the possibility of sanctions
for breach by decreasing both the number of promises made
and their breadth, revealing regret contingencies through the
conditions attached to the bargain. 0 5 A better quality of promise results, and promisees may more safely arrange their affairs
in the expectation of performance, facilitating future planning.
If promissory regimes are defended, it therefore must be for
such beneficial reliance. The possibility of beneficial reliance is
not, however, a connecting factor of the type that would support a low-fidelity theory. The inclusionary duty arises from
the general benefit that accrues to society from the capacity to
rely on promises, not from actual reliance by a particular promisee. In this way the duty presupposes the moral value of the
institution.
But why stop there? Beneficial reliance itself seems at best
an instrumental good, desirable only insofar as it promotes
some higher good. Apart from a belief that welfare gains will
result, it is not easy to see what it is about promising that might
attract. Why would we promote reliance if we thought, in a
103. The use of performance bonds as a substitute for the enforcement of
promises is proposed in M. ROTHBARD, supra note 83, at 133-40 (discussing libertarian theories under which courts should recognize property transfers but
not enforce promises through damages remedies). Such bonds implicate a hostage strategy in resolving informational asymetrics between promisor and
promisee. See Kronman, ContractLaw and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 5, 12-18 (1985) (discussing varieties of hostage techniques).
104. See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 618-25 (1981). An investment in reputation is warranted only when (1) promisor and promisee are repeat players or
information about the former's cooperative strategy will be conveyed to other
parties with whom she will bargain in the future, and (2) all such bargains are
characterized by a temptation to defect (such as arises in prisoners' dilemma
games). A cooperative strategy in a prior game may then communicate that
defection strategies are unlikely to be adopted in future games. See Scott, Conflict and Cooperationin Long Term Contracts,75 CALIF. L. REV. (1987).
105. For a discussion of considerations in devising efficient sanctions for
breach, see Goetz & Scott, EnforcingPromises: An Examination of the Basis
of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1274-86 (1980) (optimal damages rule will seek
to maximize beneficial reliance while minimizing detrimental or mistaken
reliance).
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particular instance, that it would lead to a net loss of utility? A
defense of promissory institutions therefore appears to rest on
utilitarian foundations.
Under such a theory, it is not necessary to deny that negative externalities arise, but only to assume that they are exceeded by the benefits of promising. A utilitarian defense of
promising does not require that communitarian virtue in Tonga
be denied. In fact, a better strategy for the utilitarian might be
to insist on such values, for they must on his estimate be exceeded by the values of promissory societies. The greater its
costs, the greater its virtues.
Utilitarian theories also offer a creditable explanation of fidelity to a just institution. Even if promising is desirable, this
does not suffice to bind one to the institution unless one's defection would weaken it. If an ethical case could be made for
an institution, an individual ought then to support it when fidelity to it makes a difference. Moreover, the appropriate question here is not whether a single breach matters, but whether a
rule absolving promisors from performing (or a disposition not
to perform) threatens the institution. For example, promissory
skeptics sometimes argue that "desert island promises" do not
bind promisors. 10 6 These are promises made to a dying person
at a time when no one else is around to hear them or to know if
they are performed. Yet even here a rule that these promises
are not binding would lead to fewer such promises being believed in the future. This is because a moral theory that accords a right of defection in particular circumstances affects the
behavior of parties who later find themselves in that situation.
On a utilitarian theory, desert island promises continue to have
a moral force, provided that a rule of enforceability in these circumstances is itself justified on utilitarian grounds.
2.

Nihilist Objections to Utilitarian Theories

With the failure of low-fidelity theories and of neoformalism, only consequentialist explanations of promising offer a
plausible alternative to promissory nihilism. In particular, utilitarian theories provide the strongest defense of promising. In
what remains, this Article considers three objections to the
utilitarian analysis of promising. The most serious objections
reduce to nihilism, against which no defense is offered save to
recognize it as such.
106. Arguments for and against the binding quality of desert island
promises are discussed in P. ATiYAH, supra note 68, at 59-63.
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The first objection is that high-fidelity duties require too
much of an individual. Utilitarian theories of promising prohibit not merely free riding but also conscientious objection. If
the institution deserves support without a connecting factor,
then even a principled attempt to secede from promissory societies is wrongful. But is this too hard? Must an individual be
prevented from severing links with existing societies and institutions so as to work out private utopian dreams? 1 0 7 Could Roman tax collectors legitimately have been sent out to Saint
Paul of Egypt, among his society of lions?
The context of questions of political allegiance may be too
rich to permit their easy resolution through the single touchstone of a duty to support just institutions. Much may depend
on the kind of individual and his reasons for seceding, as well
as the nature of the institution and the kind of fidelity it requires. It is also difficult to imagine how a theory of political
allegiance could mandate fidelity without some kind of connecting factor such as residence in a territory. If the nexus could be
erased legitimately, a right of conscientious objection in political regimes must be conceded. In contrast to political allegiance, however, duties of fidelity that do not depend on a
connecting factor may more easily be imagined for promissory
institutions. One reason for this is that promising's demands on
an individual seem less intrusive than the demands of a modern
state. In addition, we are likely to have less concern for the
scruples of an anarchist or visionary in matters of promissory
rather than political allegiance. This may be due to nothing
more than a stronger intuition that the institution of promising
is morally desirable.
The second objection to utilitarianism assumes that promis-

sory institutions can be justified only through the independent
desirability of the bargained-for result. This objection asserts
that, so long as any value is thought more desirable than the
bargained-for result, it is fair game to substitute a duty aimed
at fostering the higher value for the promissory obligation.
This might be termed the fallacy of content dependency,
although it is really a species of promissory nihilism. 0 8 It takes
107. See R. NozicK, supra note 49, at 309-12 (rejecting idea of one best society for all individuals).
108. A prominent example of this kind of nihilism is found in P. ATIYAH,
supra note 68, at 193-94, which suggests that promises are admissions of preexisting or noncontractual obligations. "[The modern social group has much
more difficulty in recognizing the right of individuals to create obligations in
circumstances where the group itself does not recognize the existence of obli-
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doctrines of illegality as the norm, not the limiting case, with
the content of every promise held to be of no moral worth except insofar as it accords with public goals such as distributive
justice. Utilitarianism may seem particularly susceptible to the
objection from content dependency. With its instinct that
moral issues may require trade-offs, utilitarianism may appear
to lack the barriers to paternalism of libertarian rights theories
under which public purposes might never trump private rights.
The problem with content dependency, however, is that it
misconceives the nature of the institution of promising. Promissory institutions and norms of distributive justice are not mutually exclusive, but if both are supported, the social planner
must be denied the right to substitute his goals for those of the
promisor and promisee. This is because promises are necessarily content independent.1 0 9 Thus, any perspective which asserts
that some justification beyond the fact of promising is required
for enforceability denies that a moral case can be made for
promising. From a utilitarian perspective, then, it is the institution and not the individual promise that is content dependent.
Although the institution must be one that promises greater
utility than would obtain in a nonpromissory regime, the institution so approved is one of private obligations whose content is
left to individual choice."i 0
The third objection to utilitarianism focuses on the procedural rules of promising. Not all promises are binding, but only
those that satisfy a threshold level of procedural fairness. If
procedural norms are not respected, the moral imperative does
not arise. A further kind of promissory nihilism then suggests
that theories based on the moral value of promissory institutions are rendered doubtful by the difficulty in providing a
principled distinction between procedural fairness and unfairness. If no such distinction is possible, the contractual output
may always be of dubious ethical value, and some other societal
goal, such as distributive justice, could be substituted.", Again,
gations." Id. at 194. This explanation of promising is criticized in Cartwright,
An Evidentiary Theory of Promises,93 MIND 230 (1984).
109. See supra text accompanying note 94.
110. "La morale nous commnande de ne pas traiter le contrat comme un fait
social dont le juge a le droit de tirer telle ou telle cons6quence ....
" G.
RiPERT, supra note 28, § 22, at 39.
111. What lies at the heart of this objection may be a confusion between
two quite separate questions: ought the contract be performed? and can a
fairer set of terms be imagined? These are separate questions, however, and
an affirmative answer can be given to both. In other words even if a neutral
arbitrator might have crafted slightly different terms, the contract may still be
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this attack seems most directed at utilitarian accounts of promising, for the conclusion that greater utility is derived from
promising rests on pragmatic assumptions of individual rationality. The utilitarian, although perhaps not the rights theorist,
might excuse performance if in one readily identifiable kind of
promise the promisor systematically ended up worse off as a result of judgment biases.
If this objection were taken at face value, it would be destructive of any contractual values. If contracts entered into
with a gun at one's head cannot be distinguished from those in
which the parties have the slightest disparity in wealth, the enforcement of contracts is never justified. Promising is fraud.
This kind of paradox mongering therefore must be rejected, not
only under utilitarian, but also under any ethical theory of
112
promising.
There are two further reasons why such arguments cannot
plausibly support promissory nihilism. First, save in theories
that impeach all moral choice, cases involving the impairment
of individual judgment form the exception and not the rule,
and such exceptions are readily distinguishable. Although categories of rationality and irrationality shade together, the distinction between the two may be understood even if rigid
borders cannot be laid out. Prophylactic arguments for total
nonenforceability are therefore unconvincing. Second, even if
subject to judgment biases, systems of individual choice still
lead to greater utility than realms of Natural Duty. Some recent defenses of paternalism assume that restrictions on choice
are justified on utilitarian grounds. 113 But on such theories, the
case for interfering with individual preferences is not made
merely by demonstrating individual judgment errors. Instead,
the real issue is who, as between the individual and the paternalist, has better information about the individual. Normally,
considered enforceable in its unamended state so long as promissory institutions are on balance beneficial and the cost of correction is excessive. It is
then unnecessary, to meet this objection, to deny that questions of fairness are
meaningful if the procedural requirements of a binding contract are satisfied.
112. See G. RiPERT, supra note 28, § 22, at 38-40. Attacks that question the
ability of promisors to make any rational choices must also be rejected. The
claim that individuals act against self-interest through irrationality (for example, intransitive preferences) may be restricted in scope to certain kinds of bargaining contexts in which a degree of paternalism may seem warranted. If so,
a range of unimpeded promising is still preserved. But if it is suggested that
irrationality invades all of our choices, such arguments are destructive of any
ethical theory founded on individual responsibility, in addition to promising.
113. See, e.g., Sunstein, supranote 7, at 1140-41.
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this must be the individual, for the paternalist's opinion about
how to maximize an individual's utility is parasitic upon the individual's preferences. The paternalist is permitted to secondguess individual choice in the restricted sphere in which this is
done, not because the result better accords with the paternalist's preferences, but because the individual's utility is maximized thereby. The paternalist's authority stems from a
knowledge of individual preferences, and this is derivative of
observed human choice. So, far from extinguishing individual
1 14
choice, this kind of paternalism must be founded on it.

CONCLUSION
Among ethical issues promissory theory is of cardinal importance to lawyers, for the moral value of virtually all of contract law rests on it. The most plausible theory of promising is
consequentialist, basing a duty to support the institution on the
desirable results of its adoption. Although promising's consequences are several, utility appears the ultimate good. Other
consequences, such as promisee reliance, appear instrumental
only. Thus, the institution rests most easily on utilitarian
theories.
Two other explanations of promising must be rejected.
The first of these, described as neoformalism, bases promissory
institutions on an abstract right to promise. A justification of
promising that ascribes value to the institution without knowledge of its consequences is unconvincing. Neoformalism is
flawed in assuming that promising may be preferred to competing conventions by virtue of its prudential and economic consequences without endowing these consequences with a moral
status.
That leaves low-fidelity theories, which would find a justification for promise keeping in morally binding connecting factors between individuals and a convention. On these theories, a
duty of performance would be imposed upon promisors because
of their consent to the institution, their receipt of benefits from
114. The tension between legal rules and private orderings is also visible in
canons of interpretation. Goetz and Scott have noted that rules of interpretation constrain private choice first by offering parties a restricted list of implied
terms and then by erecting interpretive barriers should they wish to contract
around them. See Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied ContractTerms, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 261, 288-91 (1985). But rules of interpretation are also informed as to
their content by private bargains, with an evolutionary process by which standard terms develop and achieve legal recognition. See id.
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it, or reliance by proninsees on the promise. None of these theories provides an adequate explanation of allegiance to promissory institutions. As a result only utilitarianism offers a
creditable alternative to promissory nihilism.
In rejecting consequentialism rights theorists may adopt
either low-fidelity requirements or neoformalism. In neither
case have they yet provided a persuasive justification of legally
and morally binding promissory obligations. This Article has
shown why they cannot do so.

